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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In April 2009, after baptism, confirmation, and twenty years as a Missouri Synod 
Lutheran, I entered the Roman Catholic Church. My reasons for doing so were manifold, 
but included an attraction to a sense of community in the Mass and the various mysteries 
of sacramentality, among other things. The fact is, in part, that Regis University and its 
Catholics sold me on Catholicism; they asked me how I might live and think better, and 
when they showed me how, their example was often Catholic. I also met Catholics 
outside of Regis, like my grandparents, various individuals at St. Mary’s High School in 
Colorado Springs, CO, my alma mater, and Colorado Attorney General John Suthers, 
whom I discuss at length in this project, who opened my eyes to Catholic theology and 
the raw power of Church teaching, starting me on a road of direction and prayer that 
ended in a second confirmation of my Christian identity.  
 During my time at Regis, I have also spent a significant amount of time 
researching legal questions and interning in legal settings. My career interests include 
public service of the legal variety, potentially as a criminal prosecutor. An interest in the 
law has led me, on various occasions, to the questions and controversy which surround 
the United States’ practice of the death penalty. Though I have attended various talks and 
lectures on the subject, worked with attorneys who prosecute or defend capital cases, and 
visited Colorado’s highest prison facility, my personal experiences with capital 
punishment have been very limited. These limited experiences did, however, spark an 
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interest in further exploring the topic of capital punishment and contemplating some of 
the most difficult moral questions it raises that American society faces today. 
 As a new Catholic, I thought that my exploration and contemplation might be 
focused best through the lens of Church teaching, both for the purpose of limiting the 
scope of the project and ensuring relevance personally. What follows here, therefore, is a 
novice Catholic and aspiring attorney’s study of the Church’s teaching on capital 
punishment and the manner in which the teaching is applied today in the United States. 
The first half (Chapters 1-3) surveys some of the most important contributions to the 
Church’s teaching on the death penalty through time, including select writings of St. 
Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, Scriptural and Traditional resources on the 
subject, the Consistent Ethic of Life movement’s statement against the death penalty, and 
Pope John Paul II’s contribution to the discussion in Evangelium Vitae. The survey 
engages various areas of inquiry, but is in no way comprehensive, and leaves ample room 
for future research and expansion. It asks, what, exactly, is the Church’s position on 
capital punishment, and how has it evolved through time? Has the evolution been 
consistent through time? How and from where can Catholics understand the teaching? 
How should they understand it? Is it possible to interpret the teaching in various ways?  
 The second half (Chapters 4-6) analyzes the contemporary approaches of 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Suthers, and death penalty abolitionist Sr. Helen 
Prejean as Catholics to issues and situations of capital significance in the United States, 
raising various additional questions. How are Catholics involved in America’s use of the 
death penalty, and how do they inform their moral approach to capital punishment? 
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Again, how should Catholics reconcile various and competing ideologies and 
responsibilities surrounding the practice of the death penalty, whether faith-based, duty-
bound, or otherwise? In light of Catholic teaching, should the United States use the death 
penalty, does it need capital punishment, and how should Catholics act given the system 
as it is? These questions are complicated and difficult, and I do my best to answer them, 
if only in part, while leaving much to be explored. 
   In Suthers’ No Higher Calling, No Greater Responsibility: A Prosecutor Makes 
His Case, a tremendous work which I discuss thoroughly in Chapter 5, he mentions a 
paper he wrote in college entitled “The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual or Just 
Unusual” in which he offered his overall support for the death penalty.1  “I had no real-
world experience with capital punishment at the time and no strong feelings about it,” 
Suthers explains regarding the paper, suggesting that his eventual real-world experiences 
with the death penalty as a prosecutor truly shaped his conscience regarding capital 
punishment, and that he had no personal conviction on the subject until living with it.2 
While my conscience may be slightly better informed about the death penalty as a college 
undergraduate and my convictions on the subject a bit stronger than Suthers’s were 
during his time as an undergraduate at Notre Dame, I echo his sentiment before 
beginning. Again, I am little more than a novice Catholic and aspiring attorney, and I 
have much to live and see before I can make any statement of finality on what I know and 
believe about capital punishment. I am in no way an expert in the discussion to come. I 
                                                             
1 John Suthers, No Higher Calling, No Greater Responsibility: A Prosecutor Makes His Case (Golden, CO: 
Fulcrum Publishing, 2008), 56. 
2 Ibid.  
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am, however, brave and curious, qualities necessary in asking the difficult questions this 
project raises, and qualities readers may find helpful in moving forward. This project was 
not easy, nor is the subject of capital punishment. Human life and the pursuit of the best 
means of defending and preserving human life, however, are well worth the effort.  
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I 
Quid Pro Quo and Casting the First Stone:  
Augustine and Aquinas on the Death Penalty 
 
 In the Gospel of John, Chapter 8, scribes and Pharisees bring to Jesus a woman 
caught in the act of adultery. Disrupting his teaching in the temple at the Mount of 
Olives, they set the woman in the center of their court, asking Jesus to put aside his 
ministry and assume the role of judge. John’s account of the incident suggests that those 
who brought the woman forth did so to test Jesus, to see how he might respond to a 
heinous wrong in Hebrew society. “‘Now in the law, Moses commanded us to stone such 
women,’” they told Jesus. “So what do you say?”3 Without hesitation, Jesus stooped 
down to write on the ground with his finger, crouching down beside the alleged 
adulteress at her position in the center of the court, seemingly disinterested in their 
challenge. “‘Let the one among you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at 
her,’” he said finally to the Church leaders anxiously awaiting his statement of 
judgment.4 As the leaders slowly left the Church, one by one, no stones thrown, the 
court’s silence and vacancy aptly indicated no one would meet Jesus’s standard for 
authoring judgment. “Woman, where are they? Did no one condemn you?” Jesus then 
asked the woman, now alone with her in the court. “I do not condemn you either,” he 
                                                             
3 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, New American Bible, John 8:5, 
http://www.usccb.org/nab/bible/john/john8.htm.  
4 Ibid., John 8:7.  
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resolved. “Go. From now on, sin no more.”5 The woman rose, left, and Jesus remained, 
continuing to pray and write indistinguishably with his finger in the ground. Readers can 
easily distinguish, however, his answer of forgiveness over condemnation as a definitive 
statement of the Gospels on true justice. Faced with death, life endured for the adulteress, 
because no one could justify taking it away – not even Christ himself.  
 The story of this incident, and Jesus’ statements in it, have endured as well, a 
consistent point for reflection by many contemplating the morality of capital punishment. 
St. Augustine of Hippo, in his 5th century commentary on the Gospel of John, engages 
this story directly in the context of judicial authority. “This is Justice speaking: the sinful 
woman should be punished, but not by sinners,” Augustine differentiates, Justice being 
Christ himself. “This Law should be fulfilled, but not by those who violate the Law. This 
is certainly Justice speaking: and others were hit by justice as if it were a wooden club.”6 
Justice’s wooden club came in the form of a finger scrawling something in the ground, 
but its unconventional form carried the same effect, calling to mind the ignored sin of 
those so intent on identifying it in the woman at the center of the court. Augustine 
advances this premise – that those without sin can judge the wrongdoing of others, and 
not otherwise – through much of his writing. “First, for your own sake, act as judge on 
yourself,” Augustine writes in his Sermon on Psalm 2:10.7 “Judge yourself first, then 
you’ll be able to leave the inner cell of your conscience in security and go out to someone 
else.”8 Stipulated in the requirement to assume a position of judgment is clarity of 
                                                             
5 Ibid., John 8:10-11.  
6 St. Augustine of Hippo, Political Writings (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 105.  
7 “And now, kings, give heed; take warning, rulers on earth.” – NAB, Psalm 2:10 
8 Augustine, Political Writings, 124.  
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conscience, a quality the scribes and Pharisees lacked and Jesus possessed, but did not 
want to lose by ending the adulteress’s life. For the purposes of judgment, however, self-
reflection can facilitate this clarity. According to Augustine, this reflection allows the act 
of judgment to separate sin from sinner, an examination of conscience which prevents sin 
from becoming a definitional element of identity. Only when this reflection is applied 
transitively, then, can judgment be carried out in a way that respects the humanity of a 
sinner over the evil of a particular sin. And at this juncture, judgment ceases to condemn, 
if it is even judgment at all, but instead moves toward acceptance and reconciliation: go 
forth, and sin no more.  
 Given Augustine’s understanding of judgment, then, capital punishment, an 
extreme form of condemnation, is morally untenable. A penalty of death removes the 
humanity which true reflection upon judgment separates from the sins of humanity, thus 
making it impossible for punishment to advance beyond sin itself. Augustine, therefore, 
concludes the following about the death penalty: 
Do not, therefore, when you are attacking the sin, put the human being to 
death. Avoid the death penalty, so that there’s someone left to repent. 
Don’t allow the human being to be killed; then someone will be left to 
learn the lesson.9  
After punishment, someone, some human person, Augustine emphasizes, must be left to 
repent for his/her sin, rather than end in it. Furthermore, if one passes the judgment of 
death on another for a particular sin, the judgment ends in sin as well, as justice is a mere 
                                                             
9 Ibid. 
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response in sin, rather than redemption of it. In this sense, judgment is not a righteous 
activity entirely separate from the sin upon which it deliberates, but a practice intricately 
tied to humanity. “If you take action against the crime in order to liberate the human 
being,” Augustine writes in his 153rd letter to Macedonius, “you bind yourself to him in a 
fellowship of humanity rather than injustice.”10 Judges are linked to those they judge, not 
only in the factual matter of judgment, but in the humanity that fundamentally joins them. 
If consideration of the crime itself outweighs the understanding of humanity present in 
the mind of a judge, then injustice ensues. Judgment, according to Augustine, should 
become an act of humanity-focused reformation, rather than a determination of sin in one 
sinner by another. Judgment that does justice, therefore, should exclude the recourse of 
capital punishment, which degrades and destroys humanity.  
 Given Augustine’s recognition of the prevalence of sin in the human condition, 
however, and his hesitancy to endorse the judgment of sinners by sinners, a seemingly 
impossible societal need emerges: for some human person or body to assume the duty of 
judging humanity. For this entity to be possible on Augustine’s terms, it would not only 
have to be aware of its own faults and humanity, but committed in judgment to the 
humanity of wrongdoers as demonstrated through the ability to separate an individual’s 
wrongdoing from their person. Despite this seeming impossibility, however, Augustine 
believes the divine authority of the State answers this societal need. In establishing this 
authority in his consideration of Psalm 2:10, he turns to Paul’s words in Romans 13:  
                                                             
10 Ibid., 73.  
9 
 
Let every person be subordinate to the higher authorities, for there is no 
authority except from God, and those that exist have been established by 
God. Therefore, whoever resists authority opposes what God has 
appointed, and those who oppose it will bring judgment upon 
themselves.11  
In essence, God remains the ultimate authority. Transitively, however, he invests his 
authority in the governing bodies of society, establishing a structure by which humanity 
can judge itself, though only with the understanding that the structure comes through and 
from divine authority. Although Augustine acknowledges the human flaws of those who 
assume this divinely-given authority through judgment, he nonetheless implores those 
subject to bodies of authority to comply with their governance. “For either you act justly, 
and a just authority will praise you,” he proposes, “or else, when you act justly, even if an 
unjust authority condemns you, God, who is just, will crown you.”12 The failsafe to the 
potentially unjust actions of governing authorities is God himself, the true author of 
redemptive justice. Citizens submitting to governing bodies, therefore, should have no 
trial of conscience in accepting their authority. Thus, governing entities within society, 
though admittedly imperfect, are given authority and the capacity to pass judgment, along 
with the expectation that authority is exercised in a way that promotes the general life and 
well-being of humanity. 
 In order to promote life, governing authorities, particularly those in Augustine’s 
5th century society, have taken (and still take) certain measures to protect life and ensure 
                                                             
11 NAB, Romans 13:1-2. Augustine, Political Writings, 123.  
12 Ibid. 
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safety given the sinful and violent nature of humanity. For this reason, Augustine 
authorizes the legality of capital punishment as a means of legitimate defense (a concept 
discussed at length in Chapter 2), given the need for a punishment in his time that 
removed lethal offenders from society in order to protect the lives of the general citizen 
population. In the first book of City of God, he specifically addresses authority’s capacity 
to defend: 
The same divine authority that forbids the killing of a human being 
establishes certain exceptions, as when God authorizes killing by a general 
law or when He gives an explicit commission to an individual for a limited 
time.13  
Augustine believed state executions were a direct translation of God’s will in certain 
instances, despite his wish that executions not occur. Given the societal conditions of his 
time and the divinely-given authority of the state, executions were a necessary evil – evil 
because homicide, as he indicates, is a forbidden wrong, despite its apparent necessity. 
With this understanding, Augustine stipulates an exception for those who kill on behalf of 
the state, separating executors from the inherent sin of their action: 
The agent who executes the killing does not commit homicide; he is an 
instrument as is the sword with which he cuts. Therefore, it is in no way 
contrary to the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill' to wage war at God's 
                                                             
13 St. Augustine of Hippo, The City of God against the Pagans (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 33. 
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bidding, or for the representatives of public authority to put criminals to 
death, according to the law, that is, the will of the most just reason.14 
Referencing Romans 13:4, Augustine extends his reflection on Paul’s earlier words in the 
epistle. Because agents of execution are truly agents of the state, which, fundamentally, is 
an agent of divine authority, state executioners, and those who authorize their actions, do 
not truly commit homicide when ending the lives of aggressive criminals. In fact, the law 
that provides for their action – the law of the state which sanctions the penalty of death – 
is an expression of “the will of the most just reason,” a will that, as Augustine indicates, 
can come from God alone. The state and its agents, therefore, are instruments of God’s 
will, and their actions of execution are justified accordingly.  
Augustine does not, however, suggest that the divinely-given authority of the state 
removes its autonomy, and that capital punishment, though a necessary societal defense, 
is the right way of justice, though he acknowledges its legality and justification. As 
indicated above, he emphasizes the need for punishment to separate sin from sinner in 
order to preserve and redeem the lives of wrongdoers – to leave someone to learn the 
lesson, rather than end their along with the lesson. When his statements on capital 
punishment are understood holistically (as they are often not), it is the justice found in 
writing with a finger in the ground that carries the weight of a wooden club, not the 
necessary evil of state execution carried out by instruments of the sword. Augustine’s 
justice, though it accepts the need to legitimately defend society, is not a virtue of 
condemnation. Instead, given the sins of humanity, justice is corrective and redemptive, 
                                                             
14 Ibid. 
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rather than an expression of retributive judgment. In many ways, Augustine’s conception 
of justice mirrors that of Thomas Aquinas, partners in foundational Church teaching on 
the subject. In the 13th century, eight centuries following Augustine’s primacy, Aquinas 
wrote the Summa Theologiae, in which he asks many of Augustine’s questions and forms 
his own definition of justice, particularly as applied to capital punishment. Like 
Augustine, he acknowledges the need to defend society from wrongdoers, but not without 
a true understanding of the purpose of punishment: correction, and not retribution. 
Justice, according to Aquinas, is in part commutative, and yet largely distributive. 
“Justice,” he defines, “is a stable and lasting willingness to do the just thing for 
everyone.”15 Actions, therefore, are not only relevant in the effect they have on the 
individuals who perform them, but in the resulting effect for communities and societies as 
a whole. Commutative justice, which determines individuals’ statuses from an arithmetic 
derivation of interactions between each other, differs in scope from distributive justice’s 
focus on the balance and equality individuals’ actions bring to their community. The idea 
of quid pro quo – “something for something” – which calls for an equal and opposite 
reaction for every action from one individual to another, derives first from an 
understanding commutative justice. Restated, quid pro quo often becomes “an eye for an 
eye,” a standard of commutative justice that those who support capital punishment often 
hold (more to come on “an eye for an eye” in Chapter 2). Quid pro quo, however, cannot 
be understood correctly without incorporating certain elements of distributive justice. “In 
all cases commutative justice demands equality of recompense,” Aquinas establishes, 
                                                             
15 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Trans. Timothy McDermott (Notre Dame, IN: Christian 
Classics (Ave Maria Press), 1989), 383.  
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“but not necessarily an eye for an eye, i.e. returning the identical action: status 
differences enter in, and simple restitution of property stolen would not inflict a loss on 
the thief nor compensate for the damage done to public safety.”16 Said differently, 
commutative justice, which Aquinas first promulgates, cannot exist without a necessary 
element of distributive justice: a thorough understanding of the human individuals 
(commutative) who engage in larger relationships and action together (distributive). 
Aquinas sees capital punishment, therefore, as a necessary remedy, in some 
instances, to restore both commutative and distributive standards of justice. “When one 
can’t restore the equal of what has been taken,” he explains, “recompense must be made 
as far as possible” in order fulfill the writ of quid pro quo.17 “As far as possible,” as 
Aquinas and both his society and contemporary communities conventionally understand 
it, is the intent of imposing the penalty of death, or taking, in commutative terms, a life 
for a life. Capital punishment, according to Aquinas, can be a necessary measure of 
societal justice, and he proposes the following: 
If a man is a danger to the community[,] threatening it with disintegration 
by some wrongdoing (murder) of his, then his execution for the healing 
and preservation of the general good is commendable. In doing wrong[,] 
men depart from the order laid down by reason, falling away from their 
human dignity in which they are by nature free and exist for their own 
sake.18 
                                                             
16 Ibid., 388.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid., 389.  
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The death penalty, in his view, can both heal and preserve; it can both mend the societal 
pain murder brings, and protect a society from additional murder as well. When an 
individual makes the choice to murder another, Aquinas also asserts that that individual 
sacrifices the freedom of autonomy of human dignity, the virtue Augustine stresses as the 
core of every individual. Aquinas, does not suggest, however, that individuals’ human 
dignity disappears irretrievably. Rather, he entrusts the dignity of malefactors to the 
public authority, much like Augustine looks to agents of divinely-given authority to step 
in and protect society as needed. 
 Both Augustine and Aquinas, therefore, consent to the basic principles of 
legitimate defense as applicable to capital punishment. Aquinas bases his argument for 
legitimate defense on the concept of “double effect,” a relationship that remains today the 
Church’s expressed reasoning in allowing capital punishment in very limited 
circumstances.19 “An act of self-defence may have two effects: it may save one’s own life 
and cost the attacker his,” Aquinas delineates.20 Conceptually, the public authority, duty-
bound to defend society, may have to take the life of an offender in order to protect the 
lives of society, the latter motivation intended, the former a necessary act of protection.21 
State executions, according to Aquinas, are never a preferred action, but given the double 
effect of self-defense, can sometimes become necessary in order to truly protect and 
promote societal life. “The only people who may deliberately kill in self-defence are 
those with public authority to do so for the general good,” Aquinas specifies, arriving at 
                                                             
19 See the Catechism of the Catholic Church, par. 2263. 
20Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 390.  
21 Ibid. 
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the same conclusion Augustine reaches regarding the transference of divine, judicial 
authority.22 Similarly, at this juncture, the duty of the agent of public authority who 
carries out a state execution is not a commutative action of murder which weighs on the 
conscience of bearer of the sword. Rather, state executions are a distributive measure of 
justice, and for Aquinas, a necessary, albeit regrettable, action of legitimate self-defense 
by society aimed at restoring quid pro quo as far as possible.  
 Many stop reading, or stop remembering, Aquinas at this point, subscribing to 
quid quo pro alone and finding the supposed backing for the death penalty they seek in 
his writing. In the same way, many start reading Augustine in City of God, establish the 
divinely-given authority of the sword to carry out state executions, and pay no attention 
to his reflections upon Jesus and the adulteress in John 8, content with his statements on 
Romans 13 alone. These individuals start and stop reading Paul in Romans 13, but should 
understand Paul more thoroughly (as I discuss in Chapter 2), and read him more widely, 
much like they should both Augustine and Aquinas. After establishing the groundwork 
for double effect and self-defense, Aquinas concludes his discussion of capital 
punishment and justice with the following sentiment: 
Penalties imposed in this life are corrective rather than retributive, for 
retribution is reserved to God’s judgment. So men should not be sentenced 
to death in this life for fatal sins […]23 
These sentences, though rarely quoted or referenced, best outline Aquinas’ position 
regarding capital punishment, more than quid pro quo, more than double effect. 
                                                             
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., 391.  
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Retribution, he states, or true authority of judgment, as Augustine establishes, belongs to 
God, and God alone. Restorative measures of human judgment and punishment, rather, 
must be corrective in nature and instituted only under the transitive property of divine 
authority which Augustine and Aquinas place in the state when necessary. Aquinas, like 
Augustine, understands the hideous and atrocious nature of murder – which, in reality, 
will never have an equal answer in murder, quid pro quo – and, therefore, permit the rare 
instance of death as punishment, which, in their societies, was necessary to promote life.  
 Augustine and Aquinas, however, should not be construed as the full-fledged 
advocates for the death penalty that many often see. Their guiding question is truly not 
“Is capital punishment permissible?” but instead “What can be done to best promote life 
and justice in society?” and for both, corrective punishment recurs thematically as much 
or more than the infrequent necessity of the death penalty. For Augustine, discussions of 
punishment and justice, at their core, must hold true to love for humanity: 
Why are you destroying the person you judge by failing to love him? For 
you’re destroying justice by failing to love the person you’re judging. 
Punishments should be imposed; I don’t deny it; I don’t forbid it. But this 
must be done in the spirit of love, in the spirit of concern, in the spirit of 
reform.24 
Do today’s agents of the sword, divinely authorized to carry out state executions as 
needed, see their actions as outcomes of love? These agents back their actions with 
Augustine’s words, and in some instances, rightfully so. In other instances, however, 
                                                             
24 Augustine, Political Writings, 125 (emphasis supplied). 
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agents neglect the spirits of love and reform, mistakenly assuming the role of grand 
retributor. It remains true that Augustine and Aquinas acknowledged the permissibility of 
capital punishment in their societies. Their statements, however, statements that outline 
the earliest Church teaching regarding capital punishment, should be taken in the larger 
context in which they view punishment as primarily corrective, urging the patience of 
love and reform in those so eager to cast the first stone.  
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II 
Moses, Machaira, and Bloodless Means:  
Scriptural and Catechismal Approaches to Capital Punishment 
 
Official teaching of the Catholic Church on a variety of subjects, including capital 
punishment, frequently stands upon two pillars: Sacred Tradition and Sacred Scripture. 
Augustine and Aquinas, for example, are two of the Church’s most frequent Traditional 
contributors, and as indicated, Scripture plays a dominant role in their consideration of 
the death penalty. As Catholics look to the Church for teaching, they recurrently research 
Traditional and Scriptural foundations. These pillars, as described together in the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, reflect the transmitted will and teaching of Christ: 
Sacred Tradition and Sacred Scripture, then, are bound closely together 
and communicate with the other. For both of them, flowing out of the 
divine well-spring, come together in some fashion to form one thing and 
move towards the same goal. Each of them makes present and useful in 
the Church the mystery of Christ.25 
Thus, Tradition and Scripture, united sources of divine knowledge, collaborate to instruct 
and inform Catholics as to the nature and intention of Christ’s mystery and the Church’s 
teaching which stems from it, teaching that addresses everything from sacramental graces 
and the Eucharist to social issues such as the death penalty. It is vitally necessary, 
                                                             
25 Catechism of the Catholic Church, Libreria Editrice Vaticana (New York: First Image Books 
(Doubleday), 1997), par. 80.  
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therefore, that a consideration of Church teaching regarding capital punishment involves 
both Traditional and Scriptural voices, helpful resources as Catholics discern matters of 
capital significance within their consciences. 
Scriptural foundations for capital punishment are a matter of interpretive 
contention. Proponents of capital punishment frequently cite Scriptural evidence as 
backing for their arguments in favor of state executions. Those who oppose capital 
punishment, however, argue that Biblical passages that seemingly support capital 
punishment often retain an alternative meaning when read in the proper context and 
original language (rather than as an isolated English translation). Biblical authorities 
discuss capital punishment in various instances – Old Testament and New, Gospel and 
Epistle, Minor and Major Prophet – and in various applications, cultures, and time 
periods. Among the many Scriptural passages that are relevant in some capacity to 
consideration of the death penalty,26 two passages, Leviticus 24:17-21 and Romans 13:3-
4, are most frequently debated among those for and against capital punishment. These 
passages, given their contentious language and interpretation, have highlighted the 
Church’s engagement with Scripture in developing its position toward capital 
punishment. 
 Supporters of capital punishment often rely upon an understood Biblical sanction 
of “an eye for an eye, a life for a life” as justification for the death penalty. This phrase 
references Leviticus 24:17-21, which reads in full as follows: 
                                                             
26 Although not discussed here, Exodus 21:23-25, Deuteronomy 16:18, and Romans 12:19 are other 
passages that have raised significant discussion among those deliberating the Biblical merits of capital 
punishment.  
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Whoever takes the life of any human being shall be put to death; whoever 
takes the life of an animal shall make restitution of another animal. A life 
for a life! Anyone who inflicts an injury on his neighbor shall receive the 
same in return. Limb for limb, eye for eye, tooth for tooth! The same 
injury that a man gives another shall be inflicted on him in return. 
Whoever slays an animal shall make restitution, but whoever slays a man 
shall be put to death.27 
If the passage is read and applied literally, the contrived meaning is relatively 
straightforward: if a man kills, he should be killed (an analogous relationship to Aquinas’ 
quid pro quo). Biblically, however, Moses introduces this law in Leviticus as one of 
limitation for the people of Israel, rather than a specific mandate. Moses intended the law 
not as a specific order (as in a murder must be answered with death), but as a limitation 
on the public response to murder (so that only one death, rather than multiple executions, 
could be justified as punishment for murder). If understood in the original Hebrew, the 
passage would then read, “If a man takes the life of any human being, he alone must be 
put to death … not more than an eye for an eye, not more than a tooth for a tooth…”28 
Dale Recinella, in The Biblical Truth about America’s Death Penalty, discusses 
interpretations of Leviticus that account for historical context. “When the ‘eye for an eye, 
life for a life’ of the Mosaic law is properly understood in its biblical-historical context,” 
Recinella explains, “we see that capital punishment may not have been God’s ideal. 
                                                             
27 NAB, Lev. 24:17-21 
28 Dale Recinella, The Biblical Truth about America’s Death Penalty (Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 2004), 49 (original emphasis). 
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Rather, the death penalty may have been allowed in limited form in the Mosaic law 
because of the people’s hardness of heart.”29 By hardness of heart, Recinella references 
the Biblically-founded condition of brokenness and violence in Hebrew society. In 
limiting the punishment for murder to the retributive death of the initial transgressor 
alone, Mosaic law ushered in a momentous change as described in Leviticus – change 
that moved to decrease violence, rather than promulgate it. 
 Not only is the law of capital punishment in Leviticus one of cultural limitation, 
but given its context in the wider realm of Mosaic law, it belongs in the larger group of 
ancient laws which have fallen out of practice as society has evolved. Mosaic law not 
only sanctioned taking a life for a life, but held a multitude of other crimes (adultery, 
sorcery, idolatry, etc.) punishable by death and endorsed various methods of capital 
punishment (hanging, stoning, and public burning, to name a few). Most, if not all of 
these practices – take, for example, the stoning of rebellious children by their parents and 
fellow townspeople, a Biblically founded practice30 – no longer meet any standard of 
common human decency (particularly in the American context) and no longer have any 
legal or statutorial foundation. Within Mosaic law, capital punishment provided by the 
Leviticus limitation (the execution of a convicted murderer, not a rapist, kidnapper, 
fornicator, sorcerer, idolater, perjurer, false prophet, or Sabbath-day worker, executions 
for whom Mosaic Law also provides in Scripture)31 belongs within this group, though 
                                                             
29 Ibid., 51.  
30 “If any man has a stubborn and unruly son who will not listen his father and mother, and will not obey 
them even when they chastise him […] Then all his fellow citizens shall stone him to death.” – NAB, 
Deuteronomy 21:18, 21  
31 Deut. 22:22-24, Deut. 22:25, Exodus 21:26, Deut. 22:13-21, Lev. 20:27, Deut. 17:2-5, Deut. 19:18-21,  
Deut. 18:20, and Exod. 31:15, respectively.  
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proponents of capital punishment still cling to Moses’s words in Leviticus as a legal 
mandate for the death penalty. “Who picked murder as the only item off the list that God 
really mandates for execution [today]?” Recinella questions. “If we used the whole list 
from the Mosaic law, who in America would not have coworkers, friends from church, or 
members of their home community executed? Who in America would be left to pull the 
switch?”32 Mosaic law approved public executions for a variety of wrongs, wrongs that, 
if still punishable by death today, would obstruct the American legal system beyond 
function. Murder was one of these wrongs, and though the larger group of wrongs has 
been rejected quite clearly in today’s system of law, murder remains punishable by death 
today, approved by many under the Scriptural pretense of “a life for a life.” 
 Although it speaks to a starkly different cultural demographic than Moses does in 
Leviticus, many read Paul’s New Testament letter to the Romans as an explicit Biblical 
command for governments to exercise their authority to take a life for a life. Paul wrote 
to the Romans between 55-60 A.D., a time in which he and other Roman citizens 
understood capital punishment via decapitation by the sword as the only means of 
execution allowed to the state. Addressing a Roman church of both Jews and Gentiles, 
Paul asserts the following in Romans 13:3-4: 
For rulers are not a cause of fear to good conduct, but to evil. Do you wish 
to have no fear of authority? Then do what is good and you will receive 
approval from it, for it is a servant of God for your good. But if you do 
                                                             
32 Recinella, The Biblical Truth about America’s Death Penalty, 69-70.  
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evil, be afraid, for it does not bear the sword without purpose; it is the 
servant of God to inflict wrath on the evildoer.33  
If the ruling authority (in Paul’s case, Rome, but in many popular readings of the passage, 
current government) can bring wrath upon evildoers by the sword, Paul’s words 
seemingly provide some support for a state-authored death penalty. Furthermore, Paul’s 
prescription of authority, as Recinella indicates, is extra-biblical, meaning it exists in a 
manner that transcends the Biblical harbor of Mosaic law. Though many accept the 
Mosaic tenet of a “life for a life,” Paul’s authority of the sword, if understood literally, 
goes beyond its Scriptural context: an established maxim that can be governmentally 
owned even today.  
 But Paul’s words, much like Moses’s in Leviticus, must be understood at a level 
beyond their literal, English-based interpretation. Analyses of the passage typically focus 
on two words: first, “sword,” the weapon by which the state can bring executions; and 
second, “inflict,” more commonly “execute” in other translations of the Greek.34 Turning 
first to Paul’s reference to the sword, two Greek words are typically translated into 
Biblical “swords.” The first is rhomphaia, the Greek word for the saber-like, long, and 
broad cutlass typically used in Pauline society to perform capital executions. The other is 
machaira, a dagger or short sword typically sheathed on a belt and used as a symbol for 
the authority of courts to inflict punishment (but not the sword used to behead, and 
certainly not a symbol of beheading). Paul uses machaira in his original letter to the 
                                                             
33 NAB, Romans 13:3-4. 
34 “[…] For he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” – Romans 
13:4, King James Version (KJV), http://www.biblegateway.com/versions/King-James-Version-KJV-Bible/ 
(emphasis supplied). 
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Romans, rather than the rhomphaia Greeks used to decapitate. Those who read “sword” 
in English translations can, therefore, mistakenly take Paul’s translated word as the 
signfier to a weapon of death, whereas it actually signifies the state’s ability to carry out 
more general punishment on a societal level, the true referent. And Paul’s sword does not 
“execute,” as some translations suggest, nor does it “inflict wrath” in the final sense of 
execution that some interpret. Rather, in this instance, the original Greek does not even 
include the verb that English translators have placed in the passage. “Execute” has been 
used in some passages, and “inflict” in others, but both with the same intentional 
meaning: “to carry out, to perform,” or “to apply.”35 Paul’s original Greek verb does not 
exist in English, and English translators’ inserted verb does not connote execution; 
instead, the passage identifies the state’s fundamental responsibilities of protection and 
justice. Given this context, Recinella offers a more accurate understanding of Paul’s 
instruction to the Romans: 
When we properly understand Romans 13:4 […] it is clear that the verse 
contains no mandate for capital punishment. It does not support the power 
of judicial authority to impose punishment upon malefactors. Our prisons 
are full of felons who are experiencing judicially imposed punishment 
without being subject to the death penalty. There is no need to impose 
capital punishment in order to be faithful to the proper understanding of 
Romans 13:4.36 
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Paul’s Scriptural statements – like Moses’s – do not explicitly authorize capital 
punishment as it is currently practiced, despite frequent readings and interpretations 
otherwise.  
 In sum, Church teaching reflecting Scripture does not find explicit basis for a 
position in favor of capital punishment. And for Catholics looking to Biblical sources for 
guidance in reconciling their personal consciences regarding the death penalty, Moses 
and Paul are not the staunch advocates for state executions many literal readers of their 
words make them out to be. But what about Tradition, the Church’s other pillar of 
teaching; how does it address the state’s authority to execute and the morality of capital 
executions in themselves? Do Traditional voices fall in unison with Scripture, contrary to 
it, or complicate it somehow? As can be read in the preceding chapter, Augustine and 
Aquinas offer positions toward capital punishment that generally align with those of 
Moses and Paul. They outwardly support capital punishment in specific circumstances. In 
some instances, they authorize the taking of a life for another life, and they view the state 
as the proper vehicle of authority to do so. The official teaching of the Catholic Church 
toward capital punishment holds true to many of Augustine and Aquinas’ arguments, as it 
has since they were initially written. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) , the 
complete document of dogmatic instruction for Catholics worldwide, places Augustine 
and Aquinas’s words on the death penalty in conversation with those spoken by Moses 
and Paul, and on a larger scale, weighs together contributing elements of both Tradition 
and Scripture pertaining to capital punishment. For this reason, the CCC, along with 
Augustine, Aquinas, and the voices present in the chapters that follow this one, can be 
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read as Traditional expressions of the Church regarding capital punishment, sources that 
combine with Scripture to author the Church’s position toward the death penalty. 
 Just as Scriptural translations have evolved over time, so also has the CCC 
changed as Church teaching has been modified and Traditional sources reevaluated. The 
Council of Trent’s Roman Catechism of 1566, for example, published under Pope Pius V, 
gives civil authorities the “‘power of life and death’” in order to protect society from 
malefactors through a “‘kind of lawful slaying.’”37 The catechisms following, published 
recurrently over the next 450 years, echoed much of the original position toward capital 
punishment articulated at the Council of Trent in the 16th century. Until 1992, the CCC 
explicitly stated, “The traditional teaching of the Church has acknowledged as well-
founded the right and duty of legitimate authority to punish malefactors by means of 
penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases of extreme 
gravity, the death penalty.”38 This nominal reference to the death penalty, and the 
meaning of retribution that accompanies it, remained in the CCC until the 1997 revisions 
that produced the version currently read and held by Catholics worldwide today. These 
revisions, written in light of Pope John Paul II’s 1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae (see 
Chapter 3), re-center the Church’s teaching regarding capital punishment on Aquinas’s 
principle of double-effect and the subject of legitimate defense. In the present CCC, the 
Church moves away from Traditional considerations of the death penalty as punishment, 
                                                             
37 Pope Pius V, Catechism of the Council of Trent for Parish Priests, Trans. John A. McHugh, O.P. and 
Charles J. Callan, O.P. (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1934), 421.  
38 E. Christian Brugger, "Rejecting the Death Penalty: Continuity and Change in the Tradition," Heythrop 
Journal 49, no. 3 (2008): 391, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed September 15, 2009).  
27 
 
instead shifting toward a view of capital punishment as a rarely plausible means of 
defending and protecting society from imminent criminal danger.  
 The present CCC, when read with its 1997 revisions, expresses a position toward 
the death penalty that significantly departs from past versions, while simultaneously 
maintaining a continuous line of voice with Aquinas, Scriptural influence, and other 
Traditional sources. In this sense, as E. Christian Brugger states in “Rejecting the Death 
Penalty: Continuity and Change in the Tradition,” the 1997-revised CCC presents definite 
changes in Church teaching, changes that can be easily identified, while presenting the 
changes in a manner that does not stray away from the traditional teaching that formed 
the initial position. Brugger’s essay outlines many of these changes. First, the CCC 
section pertaining to capital punishment (within Article 5, “The Fifth Commandment,” of 
Chapter 2, “You Shall Love Your Neighbor As Yourself,” of Section 2, “The Ten 
Commandments,” of Part 3, “Life in Christ,” starting at number 2263), is titled 
“legitimate defense,” rather than “punishment,” as it was traditionally named.39 The 
change in title takes the initial CCC discussion of capital punishment out of its section 
dedicated to punishment and incorporates it in its doctrine of defense. In doing so, it 
specifies that the death penalty does not escape the Catechismal prohibition of intentional 
killing or murder of the innocent.40  The CCC then very deliberately presents its discuss 
of capital punishment in the context of legitimate defense: 
The defense of the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be 
rendered unable to cause harm. For this reason, those who legitimately 
                                                             
39 Ibid., 390.  
40 CCC, par. 2263.  
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hold authority also have the right to use arms to repel aggressors against 
the civil community entrusted to their responsibility.41 
In emphasizing the legitimacy of civil authority to defend society, the CCC bases the 
action required to abate the unjust aggression of offenders in the words of Paul, 
Augustine, and many traditional Church voices. This emphasis, by indicating that the 
state must punish offenders to defend society, reserves any authority to exercise capital 
punishment to the state, but does so without establishing any expectation upon the state to 
carry out the death penalty regardless of societal circumstance. 
At this juncture, therefore, the CCC adds in the redemptive quality of punishment 
required by legitimate defense: 
Punishment, then, in addition to defending the public order and protecting 
people’s safety, has a medicinal purpose: as far as possible, it must 
contribute to the correction of the guilty party.42 
The redemptive, corrective, and medicinal purposes of punishment significantly nuance 
the state’s duty to defend. Punishment must have, as Aquinas explains in Summa 
Theologiae, a double effect, but in a new sense: it must protect society while 
supplementing efforts to rehabilitate an aggressor.43 Punishment cannot be a retributive 
end in itself (as prior Catechismal teaching indicated), but must serve dually as a means 
of reconciliation for offenders. The principle of double-effect and its implication of 
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redemption, then, guide a key rewrite in the 1997 CCC’s final section on capital 
punishment: 
Assuming the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been fully 
determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude 
recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only possible way of effectively 
defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.44  
By prefacing its “last option” consideration of the death penalty with the standard of 
determination of an aggressor’s person and act (an effort to establish clear and 
convincing guilt as a necessary prerequisite to any consideration of a capital execution), 
and by following the specific mentioning of the death penalty with a final possibility for 
avoidance (one last push for a bloodless societal defense), the CCC starkly diverges from 
the 1992 section discussed earlier in which it contextualized capital punishment as a 
potential recompense fitting if “commensurate with the gravity of the crime.” Instead, the 
1997 CCC’s change brings a consideration of “non-lethal means” to the forefront, casting 
the death penalty as a final and reserved measure that finds application only when non-
lethal means are neither sufficient nor possible as defense.45 
Finally, taking directly from Evangelium Vitae, the CCC makes it most definitive 
statement concerning the legitimacy of capital punishment. It concludes with the 
following: 
Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for 
effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has committed an 
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offense incapable of doing harm – without definitively taking away from 
him the possibility of redeeming himself – the cases in which the 
execution of the offender is an absolute necessity “are very rare, if not 
practically non-existent.”46  
The CCC uses Pope John Paul II’s exact words in making its final statement, and uses his 
commitment to the dignity and redemption of the human person present throughout 
Evangelium Vitae to reason the remainder of the passage. In doing so, the CCC allows for 
rare and hardly possible cases in which state executions of offenders might be necessary. 
Clear emphasis, however, rests in the state’s contemporary ability to combat crime 
through the incapacitation of offenders and their rehabilitation, rather than in the option 
for execution that the CCC presents. The 1997 CCC changes in its section addressing 
capital punishment ends in this statement of near finality, an argument that marks a trend 
toward a view that sees no need for capital punishment given the corrective abilities of 
the state in the modern world.  
In both deviating in a concrete manner from past versions and maintaining certain 
continuity with them, the present, 1997-modified version of the CCC holds capital 
executions as means of legitimate societal defense that have increasingly limited (if at all 
existent) application in contemporary systems of corrective justice. The CCC’s statement 
of increasing limitation, interestingly enough, much resembles that of Moses’s in 
Leviticus, as both suggest capital executions as reserved and better avoided ends in the 
hope that society can settle on means that avoid ending life. Despite past versions, 
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translations, or other arguments that speak to the contrary, Traditional and Scriptural 
voices do not outwardly advocate for the death penalty, but more so for the authority and 
responsibility (Paul’s machaira) of the state to defend society through redemptive, rather 
than retributive, justice. Attention therefore turns to bloodless means – incarceration, 
rehabilitation, and reconciliation for offenders and unjust aggressors. Catholics find a 
recurring central message in both Traditional and Scriptural voices, particularly as stated 
in the CCC: if life can be safely preserved, executions should be avoided in response to 
capital crimes. This message has become the central teaching of the Church regarding the 
death penalty. It reflects not only the legitimate authority and responsibility of defense as 
discussed in the Scriptural and Traditional foundations outlined in this chapter, but a 
larger movement toward respecting and protecting the sanctity of all human life that 
underlies Pope John Paul II’s statements in Evangelium Vitae and the words of those who 
advocate for a consistent ethic of life.  
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III 
Tragic Cases and the Consistent Ethic of Life: 
Contemporary Catholic Thought and Teaching on Capital Punishment 
 
The Consistent Ethic of Life, though rooted in and directly connected with 
Scripture and Tradition, is a relatively recent movement in Catholic social teaching.47 
Marvin Mich, in Catholic Social Teaching and Movements, describes the emergence of 
the Consistent Ethic of Life in Catholic circles as “articulated almost simultaneously in 
different places by very different people,” discussing the work of various activists, 
clergymen and women, interest groups, and miscellaneous members of the laity in 
promoting a new understanding of social issues involving the well-being of human 
lives.48 Numerous efforts throughout the United States in the 1970s and 1980s – 
including, as Mich lists, creation of a Feminists for Life (FFL) group in Ohio, media 
advocacy from the North Carolina-based Seamless Garment Network (SGN),49 and 
various donative and funding-oriented initiatives dedicated to the movement’s cause 
through the Diocese of Rochester, New York – seem to corroborate his description.50 The 
                                                             
47 Catholic social teaching, though not defined or discussed at length in this exercise, is generally known as 
a mass of Church doctrine on socially relevant subjects (including economics, class systems, poverty, and 
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true figurehead of the movement, however, was Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Archbishop 
of Chicago during the creation of the movement and the height of its popularization. In 
1988, Bernardin published Consistent Ethic of Life, a compilation of his various writings 
and speeches on matters of social import to the movement. In it, he states, “A consistent 
ethic of life is based on the need to ensure that the sacredness of human life, which is the 
ultimate source of human dignity, will be defended and fostered from womb to tomb, 
from the genetic laboratory to the cancer ward, from the ghetto to the prison.”51 
Bernardin’s powerful use of the movement’s rhetoric combines with a genuine sincerity 
to demonstrably indicate why he became the chief spokesperson for the consistent ethic 
of life and the mind behind the movement. His work, in a sense, reflects an evolved 
version of his original vocational ambition – a career in medicine – in that it seeks to 
preserve and protect all life, no matter the situation and condition.  
 In Consistent Ethic of Life, Bernardin included “The Death Penalty in Our Time,” 
an adaptation of an address given to the Criminal Law Committee of the Criminal Court 
of Cook County. In it, he considers the ethic’s implication for capital punishment in 
contemporary society. Bernardin’s statements preface Pope John Paul II’s Evangelium 
Vitae in 1995 and the subsequent Catechismal revisions of 1997, establishing much of the 
language and thinking present in the teaching of the Church as it has evolved toward the 
death penalty at the close of the twentieth century and into the present context. 
Identifying his remarks as those of a concerned citizen and pastor, Bernardin first 
distinguishes his “longstanding conviction that civil law and social policy must always be 
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subject to ongoing moral analysis.”52 This conviction, in essence, represents the Church’s 
larger motivation for promulgating a consistent ethic for life in secular affairs, asserting 
the need for a moral voice in evaluating policies and processes that affect the sanctity and 
well-being of human life. Bernardin takes care to note, however, that he is not a lawyer, 
and the Church is not a legislative body. But for capital punishment to be holistically 
evaluated, as he suggests, it cannot be seen as an exclusively political issue or a measure 
of correctional justice alone. The death penalty is a human construct, and moral questions 
underlay its societal foundation.  
 Bernardin’s analysis, therefore, is morally grounded. The principal issue, in his 
case, is not one of politics. He does not dispute the right of the state to execute criminals 
– he knows that Catholic Tradition, and the U.S. Constitution (at least by some 
interpretations), have established it does – but opposes the state’s choice to exercise its 
accepted right.53 The authority of the state to perform executions is much less important 
than what is done by way of authority, and the human life that the authority governs. 
Instead, his discourse centers on another guiding question: “In present circumstances, are 
there sufficient reasons to justify the infliction of the evil of death on another human 
person?54” He frames his discussion by asking, in other words, if killing can ever be 
morally justified, regardless of the guilt, innocence, or identity of a potential victim. Can 
a human being ever, regardless of the circumstances involved, kill another human being? 
Bernardin recognizes four chief arguments by which the state traditionally answers his 
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question affirmatively, defending its exercise of its privileged right to execute: 
retribution, deterrence, reform, and societal protection. He finds, however, that these 
arguments, when applied in present society, are no longer morally justifiable. Bloodless 
means, such as life imprisonment, adequately protect society from criminals while 
allowing for potential reconciliation, a possibility society has evolved to accommodate. 
The violence of a state execution, Bernardin reasons, is not retributive as a response to 
violence. And similarly, a violent penalty of death does not deter violence, but 
encourages it, a counterintuitive contribution to the cyclical violence the state aims to 
dissuade through capital punishment.55  
 In Bernardin’s view, the general causes the state has found throughout history for 
capital punishment are no longer morally justifiable. “It seems to me and others that, in 
our culture today, there are not sufficient reasons to justify the State continuing to 
exercise its right in this manner,” he firmly concludes. “There are other, better ways of 
protecting the interests of society.”56 What is needed, from Bernardin’s perspective, is 
movement away from the state’s allowed right of execution to a search for improved 
means of addressing capital crimes in society. These “better ways” step outside the cycle 
of violence and give offenders an opportunity to change through life, rather than end in 
death. But are these better ways ample punishment given the heinous nature of killing a, 
or multiple, fellow human being(s)? Bernardin responds:  
I am not suggesting that society should be a prisoner of violence or violent 
crime. On the contrary, the consistent ethic of life requires that society 
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struggle to eradicate poverty, racism, and other systematic forces which 
nurture and encourage violence. Similarly, the perpetrators of violence 
should be punished and given the opportunity to experience a change of 
heart and mind.57  
A line can be drawn, Bernardin believes, between responding with force to violence in 
society, and responding with so much force that the response becomes paradoxically 
violent in itself. A consistent ethic for life requires acceptance of the recurring nature of 
violence in human existence; the ethic does not, however, require the necessity of 
modeling this violence through responsive action, particularly by the state. A greater end 
of societal justice, therefore, can be reached through a moral commitment to punishment 
focused on protecting life, rather than the state-sanctioned punishment of violent death.  
 This moral commitment to life comes not only from reevaluating the violent 
nature and supposed merits of capital punishment, but through reinterpreting the power 
and authority of those who determine life and death. Bernardin quickly accepts the 
present authority and legal right of the state to execute criminals. He takes issue, as 
indicated, with the state’s decisions to exercise its right to execute – decisions for which 
he strongly calls for reform. Despite his acceptance of the state’s right to execute, 
therefore, he outlines a redistribution of the power of execution that shifts it away from 
the state to a “higher court,” that of the true author of life and death.58 He writes: 
It is when we stand in this perspective of a “higher court” – that of God’s 
judgment seat – and a more noble view of the human person, that we 
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seriously question the appropriateness of capital punishment. We ask 
ourselves: Is the human family made more complete – is human 
personhood made more loving – in a society which demands life for life, 
eye for eye, tooth for tooth?59 
Life is not the state’s to decide to preserve or end; such adjudication is reserved to God, 
the highest judge. In this sense, Bernardin suggests the state is actually not authorized to 
carry out capital executions. Keeping with the teaching of Augustine, however, he 
accepts that the freely endowed, contemporary state inherits the responsibility of the 
higher court – even if it should not, based on some perspectives – and that decisions of 
life and death become its own. But the state is no longer subject to the violence of Mosaic 
society, or an unrelenting absolute of quid pro quo, as Bernardin proposes. Given the 
progression of contemporary society, lives can no longer be taken for lives in a morally 
justifiable manner. Instead, to promote life, protect it, and as he dictates, to make it more 
complete, life cannot be taken away through a punishment that ends it, even in response 
to crimes that might seem to warrant such action. Consistently, Bernardin calls for an end 
to the death penalty in support of the moral interest of life, as capital punishment deprives 
society of life more than it defends the lives within it.  
 In March of 1995, eight years after Bernardin released Consistent Ethic of Life 
and “The Death Penalty in Our Time,” Pope John Paul II issued Evangelium Vitae (“The 
Gospel of Life”), a papal encyclical addressing various social issues affecting human life 
in contemporary society. In the 1990s, the movement for a consistent ethic of life moved 
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out of its foundational stage of the 1970s and past its uprising phase of the 1980s to 
become a mainstay philosophy in Catholics’ consideration of social issues, an influential 
status that remains today. In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II, in the true spirit of 
Bernardin’s consistent ethic, engages a multitude of social issues – focusing primarily on 
abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment – and, like Bernardin, emphasizes the 
inviolability of all human life, regardless of condition, situation, or circumstance. In 
Chapter III of the encyclical, entitled “You Shall Not Kill,” John Paul II turns directly to 
the matter of capital punishment, framing his discussion around the Fifth Commandment 
as referenced (dictated originally, ironically enough, to Moses in the book of Exodus). In 
Section 53 of the chapter, he prefaces his direct discussion of the death penalty in the 
context of contemporary application of the traditional commandment: 
This should not come as a surprise: to kill a human being, in whom the 
image of God is present, is a particularly serious sin. Only God is the 
master of life! Yet from the beginning, faced with the many and often 
tragic cases which occur in the life of individuals and society, Christian 
reflection has sought a fuller and deeper understanding of what God’s 
commandment prohibits and prescribes.60 
John Paul II begins his analysis with a difficult question: what “tragic cases” in 
contemporary society might warrant deviation from the traditionally held norm that 
killing is wrong? Given certain tragedies, might killing be morally justified? Like 
                                                             
60 Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, Section 53 (papal encyclical, issued March 25 1995, retrieved from 
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Bernardin, John Paul II establishes an important principle before delving into discussion 
– that God, not humans or the State, is the true master of life – but also accepts 
Bernardin’s translation of the principle in contemporary society: that the circumstances of 
a free, created society foster an assumption of the duty to promote life on behalf of those 
with the authority to exercise the duty.  
 John Paul II, however, takes Bernardin’s understanding of master and judge one 
step further. Prior to discussing tragic cases in Section 53, he states, in Section 52, that 
“With regard to things, but even with regard to life, man is not the absolute master and 
final judge, but rather – and this is where his incomparable greatness lies – he is the 
‘minister of God’s plan,’” quoting Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae (1968).61 “Life is entrusted 
to man as a measure which must not be squandered, as a talent that must be used well. 
Man must render an account of it to his Master.”62 John Paul II poses the authority to 
regulate human life not as a mere societal inheritance, but as an entrustment by God with 
the expectation that authority will be exercised in a manner that follows God’s expressed 
intent. Through action in line with this expectation, mankind can live up to its quality of 
“incomparable greatness.” Like Bernardin, John Paul II acknowledges that man is not the 
ultimate authority, but that God is the highest minister of justice, calling for increased 
accountability in evaluating actions taken by authoritative figures under the transitive 
responsibility of regulating life and death in created society. With this view of societal 
authority and the maxim that killing is fundamentally wrong in mind, he moves to 
confront what he terms the “genuine paradox”: tragic cases of “legitimate defense, in 
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which the right to protect one’s own life and the duty not to harm someone else’s life” 
become contrasting motives very difficult to reconcile.63 In this context, he presents 
capital punishment as one of the most complicated of the genuine paradoxes. The death 
penalty, generally thought to be applied in situations in which the legitimate motive for 
societal (self) defense outweighs that of an expectation never to take the life of another, is 
always a tragic case. Among the many tragic cases present in Evangelium Vitae, John 
Paul II, with the consistent ethic of life at the forefront of his mind, sets out to resolve 
some part of the genuine paradox manifest in the practice of capital punishment in 
contemporary society.  
 He wastes no time in offering partial resolution. “On this matter,” he begins, 
referring to the death penalty, “there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in 
civil society, to demand that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be 
abolished completely.”64 This tendency, in his view, comes from the growing 
technological and redemptive abilities of penal systems (specifically, the American 
system), systems that fall “ever more in line with human dignity.”65 Because societal 
authority can safely incapacitate wrongdoers, removing them from society without cause 
for fear, and because doing so provides offenders the opportunity for redemption and 
rehabilitation, the death penalty becomes an increasingly unnecessary punishment. Thus, 
as John Paul II states, societal authority “ought not go to the extreme of executing the 
offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be 
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possible otherwise to defend society.”66 This statement, in essence, sets the framework 
for the Church’s current position toward capital punishment. Societal defense, when 
understood with Aquinas’ standard of legitimacy, has previously been the Church’s first 
concern, one that the State should and does share. Because this concern is increasingly 
addressed without the need for state executions, Bernardin, John Paul II, and the 
Consistent Ethic of Life movement as a whole advocate a new answer to societal crime, 
one that no longer ends a sacred and inviolable life in order to defend others. This answer 
completes John Paul II’s discussion of the death penalty: 
If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an 
aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public 
authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to 
the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity 
to the dignity of the human person.67  
Authoring the revisions to the CCC discussed prior (Chapter 2) released two years after 
his comments in Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II identifies the evolving expectation of 
societal corrections: that authorities opt for “bloodless means” over capital executions if 
at all possible. And, in all actuality, the question of if the means are sufficient is not John 
Paul II’s chief contribution, but rather this answer, that the means are sufficient, and 
increasingly necessary. In keeping with the consistent ethic of life, bloodless means of 
punishment aimed at redemption and rehabilitation of life constitute true justice for 
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humanity, and when permissible in keeping with the principle of legitimate defense, they 
should be implemented. 
 Many, however, still read Evangelium Vitae as an acknowledgement of the 
remaining need for capital punishment in certain societal circumstances, emphasizing the 
role of the death penalty in “cases of absolute necessity” despite the growing sufficiency 
of bloodless means. This reading, though it departs from the trend John Paul II highlights 
at the beginning of his discussion of the death penalty, is nonetheless accurate. The 
Church (aside from statements by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and 
other groups) has yet to call formally for the total abolishment of capital punishment in 
contemporary society. In fact, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, 
wrote the following in 2004: 
Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and 
euthanasia. For example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy 
Father on the application of capital punishment […] he would not for that 
reason be considered unworthy to present himself to receive Holy 
Communion. While the Church exhorts civil authorities to […] exercise 
discretion and mercy in imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be 
permissible to take up arms to repel an aggressor or to have recourse to 
capital punishment.68  
Nine years following Evangelium Vitae, Ratzinger, like John Paul II, contextualizes the 
morality of capital punishment with that of abortion and euthanasia, concluding as John 
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Paul II does that the death penalty may still be warranted in some tragic cases of 
contemporary society (though Ratzinger, in this document, does not take the time and 
care to stress the preferential quality of bloodless means that John Paul II does). Thus, 
Catholics of today, though encouraged by John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae to understand 
the death penalty as a punishment of increasingly limited necessity, retain the freedom to 
support it in whatever limited capacity remains. Similarly, authorities retain the freedom 
to exercise the death penalty in extreme cases as needed. Some view this freedom 
liberally, supporting capital punishment in a variety of apparent necessities; others view it 
as a mere precursor to an imminent Church statement calling for abolishment. This 
statement, however, remains unseen as of yet, and the death penalty remains an option of 
legitimate defense when bloodless means are unavailable. 
 Evangelium Vitae, and encyclicals like it, are not considered ex cathedra, 
meaning that Catholics are not doctrinally bound to accept them, as opposed to doctrines 
given with the intention of papal infallibility. Instead, Evangelium Vitae’s standard 
requires Catholics to give thoughtful and respectful consideration to whatever teaching 
the Pope dictates. The ex cathedra standard does not, however, require Catholics to 
integrate teachings and positions into their practice of faith. The Church’s position 
regarding the death penalty as presented in Evangelium Vitae, therefore – that instances 
in which capital punishment is necessary are very rare, if not practically non-existent in 
present society – is not a “binding” position, and if Catholics decide, after thoughtful 
consideration, to reject the teaching, they are not obliged to refrain from Holy 
Communion, as Cardinal Ratzinger specified in 2004, nor are they unable to practice 
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their Catholic faith in other capacities. Some Catholic parties, like the USCCB (see my 
discussion of the USCCB statement “A Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death” in 
Chapter 6), have called for the Church to make a more definitive statement that binds 
Catholics to a position in opposition of the death penalty and promotes the abolishment of 
capital punishment in modern, industrialized societies, particularly the United States. 
Others, like Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and Colorado Attorney General John 
Suthers, whom I discuss at length in chapters to come, continue to support the death 
penalty in contemporary society as Catholics regularly involved in capital legal matters. 
John Paul II’s statements in Evangelium Vitae, however, coupled with the recurrence of 
the Catholic message as to the corrective nature of punishment throughout time, help to 
clarify the Church’s developing teaching regarding the death penalty, even given the 
stark contrast in opinions among Catholics. For Catholics, particularly American 
Catholics, who elect to support capital punishment in contemporary society, they remain 
free to do so, though Evangelium Vitae and the Consistent Ethic of Life movement seem 
to suggest their time to do so, from a doctrinal standpoint, is running out. A more 
informed understanding of the Church’s statements on the death penalty through time 
shows that along with St. Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas, individuals like John Paul II and 
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin do not reverse established Church teaching in favor of the 
death penalty, but instead renew the spirit of corrective punishment in modern 
circumstances, opting for bloodless means given the increasing ability of society to 
defend itself. 
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INTERMEZZO 
 
 Although given to various Catholics at various times throughout history, the 
underlying message of St. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Pope 
John Paul II, and the Church regarding punishment is consistent: it should be corrective, 
defensive as needed, and not retributive in nature. The state’s administration of the death 
penalty should follow course. The delivery and interpretation of this teaching, as 
indicated, is a matter in itself; and its praxis, the transition from teaching to practice and 
the relationship therein, is a correlated, yet distinct, activity.  
 I recently met with Judy Lucero, a Denver-based defense attorney who lives and 
works out of her home in the Berkeley neighborhood surrounding Regis University. She 
reminded me instantly of Millard Farmer, a defense attorney with whom Sr. Helen 
Prejean partners to fight for Patrick Sonnier’s life in Dead Man Walking. (I reference 
Millard in Chapter 6.) Judy, like Millard, has a particular interest in capital cases, and her 
vocation, as she told me in our meeting, is “redeeming lost souls.”69 After a wide breadth 
of career experiences in the law, Judy now elects to work selectively on cases in which 
the prosecution seeks the death penalty, a special calling, and for Judy and the other 
individuals I discuss in the chapters to come, a fascinating intersection of law, Catholic 
faith, and vocation. 
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 With artwork commemorating Our Lady of Guadalupe on her walls and legal 
transcripts and documents in her hands, Judy calmly told me that she thought no one 
should die as punishment for killing, and that both her Catholic faith and understanding 
of the law demand a higher standard of justice. We spoke at length about a doctrine 
known as “death is different” that suggests that the criminal justice system’s treatment of 
capital cases and administration of the death penalty, given the processes, actors, and 
fundamental questions involved, is strikingly different than all other activities of the 
criminal justice system, especially in the United States, and for this reason, capital cases 
and questions should be considered with the most extreme care and attention possible.70 
“We have to understand that capital proceedings are fundamentally different than trials 
on rape, burglary, or anything else, and for me, the difference stems from the fact that the 
life of the accused is resting in the balance.”71 Judy argues as she does and for those she 
does in capital cases because death is too different, and her belief in the sanctity of life 
that stems from her Catholic faith demands that she advocates for death’s limitation. 
 Near the end of our meeting, Judy, with her copy of the Catholic catechism and a 
motion filed in a capital trial, showed me what it really is that she does. She paged 
through the motion, and instructed me to read the following passage: 
 “Justice” is not a formula, but the name of the reality it expresses – an end 
engaging the highest ideal of free persons – irreducible to a strict rule of 
law. Justice is its own origin, motive, object, and end. […] The inherent 
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power of the court to act in the interest of justice does not exist for the 
benefit of the court – such power exists to ensure that the highest ideal of 
free persons does not lie dormant and inactive but is engaged to overcome 
disparity, dispose to equity, guarantee rights and freedom, and, ultimately, 
engender peace.72 
She then directed me to the following sections of the CCC. The first comes from the 
catechism’s discussion of cardinal virtues, the second from its statements on authority 
and the common good.  
Justice is the moral virtue that consists in the constant and firm will to give 
their due to God and neighbor.73 
Authority does not derive its moral legitimacy from itself. It must not 
behave in a despotic manner, but must act for the common good as a 
“moral force based on freedom and a sense of responsibility.”74 
“Do the two passages look at all similar?” Judy asked me. “Because they should – I 
modeled the former after the latter.”75  
Judy told me that she frequently uses the CCC to found arguments in defense on 
behalf of those accused of capital crimes, and quite literally, write faith into work. “I 
don’t even really like the law,” Judy told me. “But it’s the only avenue by which I can 
pursue my true work.” Needless to say, I was thoroughly impressed, even astounded. I 
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felt for a moment like I was standing not with Judy, but with Thomas Aquinas, and we 
were reading and discussing what the natural law should be. Judy is an example of why 
death truly is different. In few other instances would attorneys be predisposed to write the 
Catholic catechism into their arguments, and in few other instances would some 
attorneys, like Judy, feel they have to do so.   
What follows here is a discussion of three individuals – Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia, Colorado Attorney General John Suthers, and death penalty abolitionist 
Sr. Helen Prejean, all of whom, like Judy, integrate Catholic teaching and their work in 
matters of capital significance on a daily basis. Their examples are, like Judy’s, powerful, 
unique, and controversial. Their lives answer the question, “As Catholics in the United 
States, in consideration of the teaching of the Church on capital punishment, how should 
we approach the questions involved in administration of the death penalty?” Their 
answers, like death, are markedly different. 
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IV 
Antonin Scalia and the Machinery of Death: 
Weighing Oaths as Catholic and Jurist 
 
 On May 21, 1997, almost seventeen years after shooting and killing Allen 
Huckleberry, Bruce Edwin Callins died by lethal injection in a Texas execution chamber 
as punishment for capital homicide. Seventeen years earlier, on June 27, 1980, Callins 
entered Norma’s Lounge, a bar in Tarrant County, Texas, and demanded at gunpoint that 
those present surrender all monies and valuables in their possession to him. When 
Huckleberry, a patron of the bar, failed to turn over his wallet in a timely manner, Callins 
shot him in the neck, took his wallet, and left him to die.76 Callins’ execution came after a 
lengthy appeal of his capital sentence in which he petitioned the State of Texas, then 
Gary Johnson, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and ultimately, 
James Collins, the director who followed Johnson, for habeas corpus relief given alleged 
violation(s) of constitutional due process, and specifically, for bifurcating sentencing at 
his state trial,77 among other alleged acts of undue mistrial.78 Callins first entered his 
appeal in the U.S. District Court of Northern Texas, which affirmed the capital sentence, 
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and then with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the district 
court. After the Fifth’s Circuit affirmation, Callins petitioned the Supreme Court of the 
United States for writ of certiorari in the now-infamous Callins v. Collins (1994), but was 
denied a hearing.  
 Dissenting from the majority that refused to hear Callins, Justice Harry 
Blackmun, who voted eighteen years prior to reinstate the death penalty in the landmark 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976), said the following: 
From this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the machinery of 
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored – indeed, I have 
struggled – along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and 
substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of 
fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the 
Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and 
the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually 
obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed.79  
Blackmun issued his dissent, now widely quoted both as support for capital punishment 
abolitionists and as fuel for the fire against judicial activists and living constitutionalists, 
without a written opinion of the Court, an unusual step given the standard course of 
Supreme Court proceedings. His basis for switching his position regarding the 
constitutionality of the death penalty – the reason he voted to reinstate the death penalty 
in 1976, and unabashedly to reject it in 1994 – was, as he indicates, moral and 
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intellectual, and, as he suggests, arrived at with no undue turmoil of conscience. His 
reasoning, and the dissent that proceeded from it, have sparked turmoils of conscience 
within readers similar to the moral and intellectual struggle with which Blackmun issued 
his dissent. Some have agreed with Blackmun wholeheartedly. Others have lost 
themselves in the complicated morass of constitutional text and its moral implications, or 
agreed with Blackmun’s conclusion, but not his method at arriving at it. And others, like 
fellow Justice Antonin Scalia, have harshly berated Blackmun and his philosophy of 
constitutional jurisprudence. Callins typifies the rift that exists between Blackmun and 
Scalia, and those who think like them, in discerning the general “right and wrong” of 
capital punishment in the American context, the punishment’s constitutional and moral 
foundations, and the machinery of the state that carries out the death penalty in 
contemporary society.  
 Unlike Blackmun, Scalia participates fully, and without reservation, in the 
machinery of death. “My vote, when joined with four others, is, in most cases, the last 
step that permits an execution to proceed,” he acknowledges in “God’s Justice and Ours,” 
his preeminent defense of the death penalty as a Catholic.80 Paradoxically, however, 
Scalia, like Blackmun, does not tinker with the machinery, though in a different sense. 
Instead of attempting to clean his hands of the process, Scalia votes as a justice in a 
manner that leaves the machinery to function just as it does. Scalia voted with the 
majority in denying a review of Callins. Responding to Blackmun’s dissent in Callins, 
Scalia issued a concurring opinion which states, “Convictions in opposition to the death 
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penalty are often passionate and deeply held,” like Blackmun’s and the convictions of 
many others. “That would be no excuse for reading them into a Constitution that does not 
contain them, even if they represented the convictions of a majority of Americans. Much 
less is there any excuse for using that course to thrust a minority's views upon the 
people.”81 Blackmun’s conviction that “the death penalty experiment has failed” was, 
according to Scalia, an entirely insufficient reason for voting as he did in Callins, given 
Scalia’s Eighth Amendment interpretation of the constitutionality of the death penalty. 
Scalia accuses Blackmun of imposing his belief regarding capital punishment on his 
interpretation of a fixed, constitutional text. This, for Scalia, is perhaps the most capital of 
arbitral sins a Supreme Court Justice can commit. In cases like Callins, Scalia, unlike 
Blackmun, votes to uphold capital sentences when they are properly assigned based on 
the constitutional merit of the death penalty. He expects other justices do the same, 
leaving personal convictions out of their voting calculation. But Scalia also believes in 
the moral underpinnings of capital punishment – his own passionate, deeply held 
conviction – yet denies that he votes as he does because of it. Scalia votes to uphold death 
sentences in cases like Callins because of their constitutionality. But within his vote, and 
within his role as a justice, rests Scalia’s belief in the morality of capital punishment; 
without it, he might have voted differently in Callins, or as he claims, not voted at all. 
 Scalia, simply put, is a Roman Catholic traditionalist. Not only does he have nine 
children, but he attends one of the few parish churches in Washington D.C. that still 
offers a Latin Mass, two minor examples of the traditional way in which Scalia lives his 
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Catholic faith.82 It only follows logically, therefore, that Scalia adheres to what he terms 
the “traditional” view on capital punishment as authored by the Church, a view which, in 
his opinion, justifies his personal conviction regarding the death penalty, his career as a 
justice in capital matters, and the way he votes in capital cases. Though Scalia votes 
based on his interpretation of an “enduring” Constitution, he believes in the morality of 
capital punishment, and without this belief, he claims he would leave the bench.83 “In my 
view the choice for the judge who believes the death penalty to be immoral is resignation, 
rather than simply ignoring duly enacted, constitutional laws and sabotaging death 
penalty cases,” he explains, alluding to Blackmun and other like-minded jurists.84 For this 
reason, Scalia stresses that his convictions, particularly those pertaining to the death 
penalty, do not influence his vote, but do, regardless of influence, allow him to vote. And 
given his understanding of Christian thought and traditional teaching of the Church 
through time, Scalia maintains that he can support a conviction that does not find the 
death penalty immoral (as he cautions from saying he “favors” capital punishment).85 
Therefore, although Scalia denies any relationship of influence, the teaching of the 
Church grounds the causality of his action and voting as a justice. Church teaching, in his 
view, authorizes the death penalty; this teaching, because he is a Catholic, helps shape his 
personal conviction regarding capital punishment; without this conviction, Scalia could 
not sit on the Supreme Court; and without a seat on the Supreme Court, Scalia would not 
hear cases like Callins, and could not vote on them as he does. But the first peg in 
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Scalia’s structure - his understanding of Church teaching regarding capital punishment – 
is somewhat flawed. St. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, and other traditional Church voices do 
not lend him the support he thinks they do, calling into question the stability of the causal 
foundation of the vocational bench on which he sits and the position he so adamantly 
maintains.  
 In his consideration of Church teaching regarding capital punishment in “God’s 
Justice and Ours,” Scalia first references Paul’s words in Romans 13 as representative of 
the establishment of God-given authority in government, and specifically, the moral 
backing by which the state can carry out the death penalty. I’ve thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter 2 the passage that Scalia references, the sharpest point of the selection being, “If 
you do what is evil, be afraid; for [government] does not bear the sword without purpose; 
it is the servant of God to inflict wrath on the evildoer,”86 or, in the King James Version, 
the translation Scalia chooses, the state is “a minister of God, a revenger to execute 
wrath” upon wrongdoers. 87 Regrettably, Scalia interprets the execution, revenge, and 
wrath by the sword as “unmistakably a reference to the death penalty,”88 a common 
mistake of literal translation against which Biblical scholar Dale Recinella fervently 
warns, as previously discussed in Chapter 2. To review, the “sword” that Paul references, 
in the original Greek, is machaira, a symbol of the power and authority of courts, but not 
the rhomphaia used to behead offenders. Also, the “bring wrath” some translations use 
and the “execute” Scalia prefers are words English translators artificially inserted into the 
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passage, words that do not exist in the original Greek. Translators did not intend the 
insertions to connote execution, but rather, the general responsibility of the state to 
defend and protect society.89 To Scalia’s credit, he selects this particular passage to 
demonstrate how Paul separates individual morality from that of the larger state,90 which 
is an accurate distinction, though much more complicated than Paul, Scalia, and for that 
matter, Augustine understand (see my discussion of Donald Cabana, a former 
executioner, in Chapter 6). The passage does not, however, support the governmental 
morality of state executions that Scalia suggests, nor is it as representative of Church 
teaching as he portrays. Paul does not provide the “consensus of Western thought” on 
capital punishment that Scalia assumes, and Scalia mistakenly relies on his voice, among 
others, as traditional Catholic consent for the machinery of death to operate.  
 Inherent in Scalia’s interpretation of Romans 13 is the understanding that 
governmental authority has a responsibility to match crimes with an equivalent level of 
punishment – quid pro quo, or an eye for an eye, as previously discussed via Aquinas in 
Chapter 1. Scalia’s interpretation of Paul, therefore, and the understood assumption 
therein, fits nicely within his larger theory behind capital punishment: that, at a 
fundamental level, the death penalty, according to the tradition of the Church, is a 
retributive measure. This theory, however, like Scalia’s interpretation of Paul, is 
inaccurate. Scalia often says he prefers “the traditional view of Augustine and Aquinas” 
pertaining to the death penalty, which, given the principle of quid pro quo, seems to 
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bolster his personal conviction.91 Like many, however, Scalia only reads Aquinas to say 
“an eye for an eye,” an incomplete and fundamentally flawed reading. “Penalties imposed 
in this life are corrective rather than retributive, for retribution is reserved to God’s 
judgment,” Aquinas writes, as previously quoted, following his explanation of quid quo 
pro.92 Though Aquinas acknowledged the need for the death penalty in the society in 
which he lived – for crimes of irreparable harm, particularly perverted offenders, and 
those wrongdoers from whom defense was impossible – he, like Augustine, emphasized 
the corrective quality toward which punishment must aspire, rather than any retributive 
character it should assume, as retribution belongs to God, and God alone, and not to 
governmental authority. This is a message, however, that Scalia misses, whether 
consciously or otherwise. Scalia seemingly skips over Augustine’s command to “avoid 
the death penalty, so that there’s someone left to repent,” instead grabbing eagerly for the 
sword of which he is an instrument.93 When Scalia reads Augustine and Aquinas, he 
isolates instances in which they advocate for the death penalty in their particular societies 
and interprets this advocacy as a call for retribution. In doing so, he misses the larger 
context of correction in which they discuss punishment and justice. 
 Because Scalia misconstrues St. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, and the tradition of the 
Western Church as a case for retribution by way of the death penalty, it is no surprise he 
strongly opposes John Paul II’s plea for correction over execution in Evangelium Vitae 
and similarly themed (and sometimes identical) statements in the 1997 version of the 
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Catholic catechism. Scalia takes particular issue with John Paul II’s mentioning of 
defense in the following passage from the encyclical: 
The nature and extent of punishment […] ought not to go to the extreme of 
executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other 
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society.94 
By way of brief contextualization, John Paul II precedes this passage by noting that 
society must impose “an adequate punishment for the crime” on capital offenders, and 
concludes that given the evolved and improved nature of Western penal systems, cases in 
which capital punishment is necessary are “very rare, if practically non-existent.”95 By 
“adequate,” Scalia believes John Paul II means equal, or, in the case of the death penalty, 
a death for a death – quid pro quo, or retributive, commutative justice. When John Paul II 
then relies on the standard of defense, therefore, as the chief determinant of the societal 
necessity of the death penalty, Scalia strongly objects, because, as he states, defense “has 
no bearing whatever upon the adequacy of retribution. In fact, one might say that it has an 
inverse bearing.”96 Given this interpretation, Scalia is absolutely correct. If retribution is 
the primary purpose of the death penalty, than societal defense cannot be the standard by 
which to evaluate the necessity of capital punishment. Scalia cites Timothy McVeigh, 
who killed 168 people in the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, as an example, one of the 
more poignant examples in death penalty debates. Scalia acknowledges that society could 
have locked McVeigh away forever, preventing another mass murder (though his 
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perception of modern prisons is a bit skewed);97 but can life imprisonment ever justify the 
168 people that died by McVeigh’s action? Examples like McVeigh’s certainly seem to 
call for a punishment that matches the crime, retribution that Scalia eagerly assigns on 
behalf of society. But retribution, as Augustine and Aquinas actually write, ultimately 
belongs to God, and is not the primary purpose of capital punishment, nor a Church 
theme lost in Evangelium Vitae, nor an accurate foundation on which Scalia can base his 
capital jurisprudence as a Catholic. 
 If Scalia were to interpret John Paul II’s “adequate” as sufficient to protect 
society, rather than equal, he might better take and understand John Paul II’s encyclical 
and the corrective punishment he promotes. If the penal system can adequately protect 
society from an offender to “preserv[e] the general good,” as Aquinas suggests, than 
someone can be left to repent, as Augustine encourages, and the death penalty becomes a 
very rare, if not practically nonexistent, means of punishment in society. This 
interpretation lends to an enhanced understanding of “adequate” and a logical inclusion 
of defense as a standard of evaluation. Because Scalia sees Evangelium Vitae as a 
departure from the doctrine of retribution, however, rather than a continuation of the case 
for correction, he mistakenly frames John Paul II’s argument in itself and the way in 
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which it is framed in the larger context of Catholic social teaching on capital punishment. 
“If just retribution is a legitimate purpose (indeed, the principal legitimate purpose) of 
capital punishment,” Scalia poses at the conclusion of his discussion of Evangelium 
Vitae, “can one possibly say with a straight face that nowadays death would ‘rarely if 
ever be appropriate?’” 98 Hoping to lure his readers into the seemingly obvious “no,” 
Scalia finishes his argument with the misdirection with which he began. The educated 
Catholic reader, however, knows that correction, rather than retribution, is the principal 
legitimate purpose of punishment, and has been since the time of Augustine and Aquinas. 
And all readers, as sinful, imperfect humans, should be hesitant to accept the task of 
judgment that Scalia offers, because if killing a murderer is the best recompense for 
murder, God can issue judgment accordingly, and God alone. 
 Ultimately, Scalia decides that because Evangelium Vitae and the latest version 
are not ex cathedra as discussed in Chapter 3, and because he has given them his 
thoughtful consideration, his disagreement and preference for his understanding of the 
Western consensus of the Church on capital punishment permit him to keep his job and 
participate fully and willingly in the machinery of death. “It would be remarkable to 
think,” he summarizes, “that a couple of paragraphs in an encyclical almost entirely 
devoted not to crime and punishment but to abortion and euthanasia were intended 
authoritatively to sweep aside (if one could) two thousand years of Christian teaching.”99 
Scalia is correct once again on two fronts – first, John Paul II primarily addresses 
abortion and euthanasia in Evangelium Vitae, issues that belong on a different moral 
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plane in some respects than capital punishment, and second, it would be impossible to 
sweep aside two thousand years of Church teaching in mere paragraphs – but misses two 
corresponding points as well – first, like abortion and euthanasia, the death penalty 
regulates the God-given (and God-alone-taketh) quality of human life, and second, 
Evangelium Vitae’s paragraphs on capital punishment do not sweep away past teaching, 
but confirm and integrate it in the present societal context. “Is it prudent,” Scalia later 
asks, “to imperil acceptance of the Church’s hard teachings on birth control and abortion 
and euthanasia […] by packaging them – under the wrapper ‘respect for life’ – with 
another uncongenial doctrine that everyone knows does not represent the traditional 
Christian view?”100 With respect for Justice Scalia, it might not be prudent to do as he 
suggests, but the doctrine is actually quite congenial, and it does represent the traditional 
Christian view, a view that fundamentally respects life with the other subjects of 
“binding” teaching Scalia references, albeit Evangelium Vitae is not binding, at least to 
him. 
 In The Death of Innocents, death penalty abolitionist Sr. Helen Prejean (whom I 
discuss at length in Chapter 6) speaks out against Scalia’s vote in Callins and other 
aspects of his jurisprudence in capital matters. “Justice Scalia and I couldn’t be further 
apart,” she states plainly. “He provides the ‘legal groundwork’ to send people to their 
deaths, and I resist his orders every way I can.”101 After witnessing Patrick Sonnier (and 
four others) die in execution chambers after failing in appeals processes much like that of 
Bruce Callins, Prejean discovered firsthand the tremendous power of decision contained 
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within the American legal system. She also discovered Scalia, a fellow Catholic, her 
brother Louie’s duck-hunting partner, and a participant in the machinery that sent her 
incarcerated spiritual mentees to their deaths in execution chambers. Her critique of 
Scalia covers some of the same points discussed previously, most notably Scalia’s 
misinterpretation of Romans 13. She also admonishes Scalia’s indifference to the 
humanity of individuals that ends in capital punishment, an indifference that Prejean 
deems characteristic of machine-like behavior:  
Not only does Justice Scalia judge behavior out of all context, he reads the 
Constitution without acknowledging the influence of his own moral 
values, and he quotes scripture without taking into account the historical 
situations its authors were addressing. Such compartmentalized thinking is 
the way machines work, not human beings.102 
To Scalia’s credit, he is not a machine, but a human being, just like Prejean, and just like 
all involved in capital matters. He is also a brilliant jurist and a steward of the U.S. 
Constitution in a nation which needs true stewards. His fidelity to a literal and 
historically-supported understanding of the Eighth Amendment is commendable, and in 
many instances, preferable to broader readings that impose personal convictions on the 
Constitution that do not match that of the people to which the document and its laws 
ultimately belong. Scalia correctly identifies the proper medium of change in society’s 
use of the death penalty as legislative, and not judicial. But his thinking, as Prejean 
describes, is somewhat compartmentalized, and to extend the characterization, the 
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compartments of Scalia’s mind are so separated that they are weakened by a lack of 
integration, not to mention the compartments are erroneously constructed to some extent 
in themselves. Though Scalia should not compromise his fidelity to the Constitution and, 
as Prejean suggests, suddenly declare the death penalty unconstitutional and vote 
accordingly, his belief in the morality of capital punishment as a Catholic deserves 
review beyond the consideration and rejection of teaching he has given at present. 
 In “God’s Justice and Ours,” Scalia twice references Thomas More, patron saint 
of lawyers, as an example of a Catholic who models his belief in the morality of capital 
punishment through work as a jurist. First, Scalia quotes More’s final words to Cranmer, 
More’s executioner in Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons, a fictional account of More’s 
death. Scalia believes More’s final words in Bolt’s play, his sentiment that “[God] will 
not refuse one who is so blithe to go to Him,” effectively capture the traditional Western 
conception of the death penalty as an outcome of free will.103 Later, Scalia notes that 
“one of the charges leveled by [More’s] detractors was that, as Lord Chancellor, he was 
too quick to impose the death penalty.”104 More lived in a 16th century English society in 
which capital punishment was necessary to remove harmful criminals from society. The 
death penalty was also available for a much wider range of crimes – robbery, witchcraft, 
even cutting down the wrong tree – for which the penalty can no longer be assessed 
today. In refusing to swear to the Act of Succession, More died by the penalty, and his 
life and martyrdom serve more as a powerful statement against capital punishment, 
perhaps, than as evidence Scalia uses to promote it.  
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Given Scalia’s argument for the death penalty, another section from Bolt’s play 
seems particularly applicable to his discussion. When More’s family visits him for the 
final time in prison, More’s daughter, Meg, attempts to persuade him to take Henry’s 
oath, urging him to “say the words of the oath and in your heart think otherwise.”105 More 
responds to his daughter and says, “When a man takes an oath, Meg, he’s holding his 
own self in his own hands. Like water. And if he opens his hands then – he needn’t hope 
to find himself again.”106  It seems that, somewhat like More, Justice Scalia holds an 
oath, and himself, in each hand. One is to his country, to its Constitution, and the law and 
people it serves. The other is to his Catholic faith, his Church, and ultimately, to his God. 
Scalia endeavors to keep these oaths separate, though he acknowledges that the latter, his 
oath to his faith, enables the former, his oath as a justice. As a father, husband, friend, 
Catholic, and statesman, More had many oaths as well, but in the end, according to Bolt’s 
play, he acknowledged an underlying commonality – love, and specifically, love for truth 
– that prevails over all.  
If Scalia’s oaths have a common denominator in his consideration of the death 
penaly, which seems fleeting, if existent, it is most readily retribution, and not More’s 
love for truth. In his mind, the Church teaches retribution, which becomes his personal 
conviction in supporting the death penalty. He therefore sits on the Supreme Court, which 
he views as the final step in the machine of capital retribution, and votes as he does in 
capital matters in order to enact constitutionally acceptable retribution on wrongdoers 
who deserve punishment. The Constitution, then, becomes Scalia’s secondary oath, 
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though in the way Scalia arranges his argument in support of the death penalty, the 
Constitution often appears as his first. What would happen, then, if Scalia were to find his 
oaths in conflict with one another, or find that one of his oaths, most likely retribution, is 
fallaciously informed? What might Scalia do if he woke up one morning and realized that 
the message of the Church is not one of retribution, and that he can no longer support the 
death penalty by personal conviction? What if, upon further reading of Augustine and 
Aquinas, Scalia simply decided he was unsure as to whether or not capital punishment is 
morally tenable? Any of these occurrences, according to Scalia, would result in his 
resignation from the bench, the only way to keep his oath to the Constitution from 
dripping out of his hands. Scalia could not sit on the bench and vote to uphold a 
constitutionally mandated punishment when his conscience calls for its impracticability, 
and would have no option but to step aside. And what a remarkable and unprecedented 
act that would be (though not necessarily a suggestion of this exercise) if Scalia resigned 
his seat, standing fast to his oaths to his Catholic faith and the Constitution and stepping 
down from the highest court of human judgment, even at the risk of being a hero.107  
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V 
John Suthers and the Prosecution of Capital Offenders: 
Seeking the Best Answer for Society’s Greatest Evils 
 
 After returning from tours of service in Vietnam, a group of GIs stationed at Fort 
Carson, CO in the summer of 1975 formed a gang that burglarized various restaurants 
and other merchants in the Colorado Springs area. Among other crimes, their primary 
misdeed was robbery, but after agreeing together to murder anyone who stood in their 
way or came to know of their actions, homicide became frequent as well. Over the gang’s 
two-month crime campaign in the summer of 1975, the group killed at least five people. 
Nineteen-year-old GIs Michael Corbett and Freddy Lee Glenn, two of the gang’s 
members, were each responsible for awful, willful murders. Corbett stabbed a fellow 
soldier with a bayonet when the soldier refused to give him a marijuana cigarette. At a 
party following the killing, Corbett exhibited the bloody blade used to murder the soldier 
and described to those present the satisfaction of plunging the knife into the soldier and 
listening to his bones crack.108 One of Glenn’s victims was Karen Grammer, an eighteen-
year-old waitress at a Red Lobster in Colorado Springs. When the gang of GIs arrived at 
Grammer’s Red Lobster on July 1, 1975, and found it closed, the gang altered their 
original plan of robbing the restaurant and abducted Grammer, taking her to a nearby 
apartment where members of the gang alternated raping her. Afraid of what might happen 
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if they released her, the gang decided to kill her, and Glenn stabbed her multiple times, 
slit her throat, and left her for dead in an alley. Still alive, Grammer crawled fifty yards to 
a nearby trailer park where she died attempting to reach one of the trailer’s doorbells. At 
trial, juries convicted both Corbett and Glenn of first-degree murder and sentenced them 
to death, but their sentences were changed to life imprisonment in 1978 when Colorado 
overturned its death penalty statute.  
 As a law student intern at the 4th Judicial District Attorney’s Office in Colorado 
Springs, CO in the summer of 1975, John Suthers researched various legal issues that 
arose in Corbett and Glenn’s cases and attended much of their trial proceedings. “I had 
never been exposed to such evil,” Suthers remembers in No Higher Calling, the book I 
reference in this project’s introduction. “As a small part of the prosecution team, I felt the 
immense satisfaction that prosecutors feel when they are successful in holding a 
defendant responsible for a reprehensible crime.”109 This experience, among others, led to 
Suthers’s career as a prosecutor. After completing law school, Suthers returned to the 
Colorado Springs DA’s Office, where he spent the early part of his career and was later 
elected as CO’s 4th Judicial District Attorney. From there, Suthers served four years as 
the presidentially appointed U.S. Attorney for the State of Colorado, and currently 
represents Colorado as the state’s Attorney General. Throughout his career, Suthers has 
prosecuted many capital cases, and in numerous instances, has sought the death penalty. 
He has encountered criminals whose evil actions have rivaled and even surpassed those 
of Corbett and Glenn in the summer of 1975, and has found a life’s worth of meaning in 
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demanding accountability for awful crimes on behalf of society as a prosecutor. Suthers 
has dedicated his life to the prosecution of societal evil, and in some instances, the evil 
has been of so great a magnitude that in his view, only the death penalty would suffice as 
the desired prosecutorial outcome. 
 Though Suthers has become an accomplished prosecutor and public servant, he 
was and is first a Roman Catholic. Raised and educated for sixteen years in Catholic 
schools, the foundation of Suthers’s character resides in his Christian faith. One of his 
guiding principles in life, “sic transit gloria mundi,” or “so passes the glory of the 
world,” a phrase inscribed on a needlepoint that has hung in every office Suthers has ever 
occupied, is an adage that his high school Latin teacher, a nun, first introduced to him. 
This same nun encouraged him to pursue a career in public service to others, a significant 
influence in Suthers’s eventual choice of vocation. Suthers’s Catholic upbringing is 
evident also in the way in which he views the world and the law that regulates it. 
Fundamentally, Suthers understands humans as inevitably sinful and self-interested 
members of a society that tends toward chaos and anarchy if not regulated by a 
communal social contract – the essential relationship Augustine posits in his City of God 
and City of Man. This contract sets rules and regulations for a society in order to protect 
it, and when these rules and regulations are violated, the community steps in to enforce 
the contract, often by way of punishment. This, in Suthers’s opinion, is the principle role 
of a prosecutor: to enforce a community’s social contract.110 During his time as a 
prosecutor in Colorado Springs, Suthers assisted in founding the St. Thomas More 
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Society, a group for Catholic lawyers in Colorado Springs who meet to discuss subjects 
of faith and law. One set of group discussions explored the seven deadly sins – greed, 
pride, lust, anger, envy, gluttony, and sloth – sins that Suthers has encountered repeatedly 
in enforcing the societal contract of American communities. The death penalty, a 
punishment that accompanies capital crimes often resulting from these cardinal sins, 
surely arose as a controversial topic in the discussions of the More Society, and Suthers 
undoubtedly defended his position in support of capital punishment, a position “in 
opposition to the current view, although not the historical view, of the church 
hierarchy.”111  
 Like Antonin Scalia, Suthers’s understanding of the historical view of the Church 
hierarchy could use additional research, particularly in depth and breadth of reading and 
understanding Thomas Aquinas, as he believes Aquinas provides historical precedent for 
Catholic support of the death penalty. Suthers relies primarily upon Aquinas’s principle 
of double effect, and the self-defense therein, as indicative of historical Church teaching 
regarding the death penalty. While Suthers correctly identifies Aquinas’s double effect as 
one of the most important, if not the most important, contributions to Catholic social 
teaching on the death penalty throughout history, and even today, he mistakenly isolates 
it as Aquinas’s chief statement on the subject and fails to contextualize double effect in 
the larger scope of Church voices and statements on capital punishment. In the previous 
chapter, I pointed out Scalia’s misinterpretation of Aquinas’s central message regarding 
punishment as one of retribution, rather than correction, that Aquinas, like Augustine, 
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actually intends. This clarification applies to Suthers as well. Suthers, however, though he 
explicitly states that “the punishment must fit the crime” prior to his discussion of double 
effect, does not see Church doctrine as retributive to the extent Scalia does, though he 
defends retribution as an acceptable intent of punishment.112 He believes retribution seeks 
necessary accountability for societal crime, and can exist without vengeance as 
motivation. Suthers combines what he understands as the Church’s response to capital 
crimes – self-defense and retribution – with what he believes to be the only adequate 
response from society to murders like that of Karen Grammer – the death penalty. 
Suthers supports capital punishment in society because, as a prosecutor, he has seen the 
power of the death penalty and the tightening effect it has on public safety. He has looked 
individuals like Michael Corbett and Freddy Lee Glenn in the eye, has seen firsthand the 
evil of their actions, and has worked as a prosecutor to restore the societal contract and 
preserve and protect life to the best of his ability, needing and using the death penalty in 
order to do so. And though he could gain a wider understanding of Aquinas in the context 
of the Church’s message of mercy and correction, his experience testifies to the 
horrendous crime and evil in society that require an appropriate punishment and answer 
for society. 
 Although Suthers respects the rationale behind life imprisonment, he continues to 
support capital punishment in society in a very limited capacity for crimes that require the 
highest retributive societal response and for individuals who present an uncontainable 
risk of harm to society. When defending his position in support of the death penalty, 
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Suthers frequently cites numerous instances he has encountered as a prosecutor where 
prison inmates have murdered fellow inmates and correctional officials while serving life 
sentences.113 These examples, in his opinion, along with those of individuals like Michael 
Corbett and Freddy Lee Glenn, belong in the category of rare, practically non-existent 
cases that Pope John Paul II identifies in Evangelium Vitae for which the death penalty is 
still morally viable. Not only does the increased security of death row deny the possibility 
of additional murder in the future, but the death penalty alone can satisfy the societal 
need for a response to an inmate’s action of homicide while in prison. Without recourse 
to capital punishment, adding years to an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment hardly 
punishes an inmate’s wrongdoing or holds the inmate responsible for ending a life. “Life 
imprisonment is simply inadequate in these types of circumstances,” Suthers urged to me 
in a personal interview. “Something must be done to enforce accountability on behalf of 
society, and capital punishment alone carries enough weight to enforce the [societal] 
contract.”114 The evil present in the case of an inmate killing another inmate or a prison 
guard is undeniable, and raises one of the most difficult scenarios in discerning the 
practical morality of capital punishment in contemporary society. What is to be done to 
punish an inmate who ends the life of another while serving a life sentence in prison? Is 
moving the inmate to a higher security prison enough of a response, or is the retributive 
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measure of capital punishment a viable, or even necessary, option? Suthers argues 
fervently for the latter, as the death penalty is, in his opinion, the only answer for this 
type of wrongdoing.  
 When I asked in our conversation what role rehabilitation and redemption play in 
the fate of capital offenders, particularly for those who kill and then kill again in prison, 
Suthers responded that those who face the death penalty have every opportunity to repent. 
“Those facing capital execution for a terrible affront to society have the opportunity to 
repent for their actions and make amends to God. Death row is not devoid of redemptive 
ingredients,” he said, calling attention to spiritual advisors like Sr. Helen Prejean and the 
time and services available to those sentenced to death.115 In Suthers’s view, an inmate’s 
time on death row combines a necessary retributive measure on behalf of society with an 
opportunity for an offender’s correction and renewal. For this reason, Suthers does not 
find that his support for the death penalty as a prosecutor compromises the beliefs he 
holds as a Catholic, though he acknowledges his position places him in some contrast to 
that of the Church. Tragic cases of inmates murdering each other or guards, gangs of 
soldiers gathering together and planning group homicides, and other heinous evils present 
in society require the death penalty, Suthers maintains, the only measure by which 
society can match crimes with the proper punishment, and the primary way, given his 
understanding of Thomistic self-defense, by which Suthers integrates his convictions 
regarding societal justice with those he holds as a Catholic. These tragic cases do not 
prevent the good that can come from an offender’s rehabilitation process, but in some 
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ways, according to Suthers, promote what can come from reconciliation. In Suthers’s 
view, capital punishment satisfies the highest standard of justice society can afford, a 
standard that he accepts as a Catholic and pursues as a prosecutor. 
 Though Suthers makes a compelling case for capital punishment as a viable and 
necessary standard of justice in society, the question remains as to whether a better 
standard exists, one that more readily meshes with his Catholic faith. In our discussion of 
rehabilitation, Suthers brought up the concept of restorative justice, the idea that by some 
action, offenders and the legal and penal systems can work together to repair or redeem 
crimes committed against society. “I don’t really believe in much of what restorative 
justice promises,” Suthers explained, pointing to the example of a victim of rape sitting 
down with the rapist in an attempt at mutual reconciliation, or the family of a murder 
victim sitting down with the murderer with a similar intended goal of restoration. “I just 
don’t think anyone is going to really want to talk in that type of situation, and I don’t 
think much can come from it,” he remarked.116 This conclusion fits logically with 
Suthers’s belief in the merit of retribution, as a taken life can never be fully restored, 
while one can be taken in return to match the life lost. Suthers is correct that forgiveness 
is an incredibly high standard of justice, particularly when forced through the arranged 
examples he gives. But forgiveness is not impossible, and the stories of Helen Prejean, 
Patrick Sonnier, Donald Cabana, Antoinette Bosco, and all those discussed in Chapter 6 
show that while a life taken in a murder can never be restored to what it was, much can 
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be accomplished by, as Augustine states, “[leaving] someone to learn the lesson.”117 
Restorative justice does not negate the need for punishment, nor does it do away with the 
societal requirement for an answer to wrongdoing for which Suthers so strongly 
advocates. Instead, restorative justice combines corrective elements for a wrongdoer with 
Suthers’s vengeance-free version of retribution through punishment, a middle ground that 
Suthers should reconsider.  
 As I finished my interview with Suthers, he stressed that he is a well-read and 
faithful Catholic. “I went to Catholic schools for sixteen years,” he reminded me. “I read 
my catechism dutifully and kept up with all that the Church taught. No one ever told me 
that the death penalty was wrong.”118 As Suthers is well aware, the Church has, until very 
recently, acknowledged the death penalty as a necessary practice to defend society from 
individuals intent on causing harm. He is also aware, however, that the same teaching, on 
the surface, is changing. In No Higher Calling, he concludes his discussion of capital 
punishment with the following:  
I’ll continue to examine my conscience concerning the issue, but I suspect 
I’ll continue to view death as an appropriate punishment in a narrow class 
of particularly heinous murders that combine obvious premeditation and 
overwhelming evidence of guilt and for which any other penalty seems to 
me to be an inadequate societal response.119  
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It is encouraging that Suthers will continue to weigh the morality of capital punishment 
as a Catholic and prosecutor. He might start, as suggested previously, with a wider 
reading of Aquinas and Augustine to expand his understanding of the historical view of 
the Church hierarchy, which, though it may appear to be changing, authors a message of 
correction that remains consistent in that of the present Magisterium, albeit calling for a 
different outcome in life than previously sanctioned state executions. Suthers points to 
some of society’s most tragic and difficult cases of violence as circumstances in which 
the death penalty remains necessary and falls outside of the scope of society’s ability to 
defend and protect. As a prosecutor and guardian of society, he knows these cases better 
than anyone. If he is correct in that the death penalty is a necessary answer, his Catholic 
faith still calls for rehabilitation of all offenders to the greatest extent possible, 
rehabilitation that might exist more successfully outside of death row.  
These points aside, Suthers has proven his commitment to enforcing society’s 
code throughout his career as a prosecutor, and has done so in a way that has engaged his 
Catholic faith, rather than artificially separating it from his vocation. He, like Antonin 
Scalia, is a faithful steward of the Constitution and understands the intended design of 
American society and the necessary mode of altering it. “If I had felt differently about 
capital punishment at the start of or at any point during my career, I couldn’t have been a 
prosecutor,” Suthers promised me, indicating he would, like Scalia, step down from his 
position if his personal conviction regarding the death penalty changed, rather than force 
his conviction on society.120 Keeping with Scalia and Suthers’s shared affinity for 
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Thomas More, Suthers, a Catholic jurist with a strong commitment to the oaths of his life, 
may be the closest individual that Colorado (if not the United States) has to a 
contemporary Thomas More – a Catholic prosecutor for all seasons. As Suthers’s career 
experience shows, “we see that avarice, anger, envy, pride, sloth, lust, and stupidity 
commonly profit [today] far beyond humility, chastity, fortitude, justice and thought, and 
we have to choose, to be human at all,” some of More’s final words to Meg during their 
last meeting in Bolt’s  A Man for All Seasons.121 Our society and its legal system need 
men like John Suthers, men who choose to be human, even when this choice, like the 
public service to which he has dedicated his life, is less than profitable. We need Suthers 
to continue to examine his conscience in order to find the best societal answer for the 
greatest evils of our time, balancing his experience with an informed sense of morality 
and faith. Additionally, we need to join him in the truest efforts of corrective and 
restorative justice, considering how we must choose to be human in the action and 
conduct of our lives.  
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VI 
Living on the Ground with Helen Prejean: 
Facing the Realities of American Capital Punishment 
 
 I first met Sr. Helen Prejean in April 2009 at a talk she gave at Naropa University 
in Boulder, CO. When I arrived at Naropa before the talk, I saw Prejean finish a 
conversation with a Naropa student and head to the bathroom before taking her spot on a 
stage in a lecture hall. Alhough a somewhat inconsiderate move on my part, I stopped her 
before she reached the bathroom, thinking it might be my only chance to request a 
personal interview at a later date. I told her who I was, that I was studying at Regis 
University, and that I was writing a thesis on Catholic social teaching and capital 
punishment. Though I’m sure she wished she could have just gone to the bathroom in 
peace to gather her thoughts before speaking, she agreed to a personal interview at a later 
date, smiling at me with a certain gleam in her eye – a gleam for the Jesuits, I thought, or 
perhaps recognition of Regis, where she has spoken before. As I’ve since interviewed 
Prejean and studied her writing and work as a death penalty activist and abolitionist, I 
now understand the gleam in her eye was one of hope for what I might come to learn 
through the process, and hope that my work might influence others, particularly Catholic 
others, to inform their consciences regarding the practice of capital punishment in 
contemporary American society. It is a tremendous statement to Prejean’s character that, 
given her rigorous travel schedule and work load, she volunteered her time to speak with 
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me, a lowly undergraduate dipping my toes in the oceanic study that is the topic of this 
exercise. The same can be said of John Suthers, who in our conversation acknowledged 
Prejean as someone who “has lived what she talks about and actually knows the 
intricacies of our American legal system and the death penalty debate,” high praise from 
someone with an opposing view on the subject.122 Prejean “lives on the ground,” as she 
often states, to fight what she views as one of the greatest moral problems of 
contemporary American society.123 Her story is one of true gumption, and it meets and 
surpasses Suthers’ praise. 
 Prejean grew up witnessing many of the evils she would combat as a consecrated 
woman. “Daddy, an attorney, represented a slew of black clients, charging them five 
dollars for his services,” she remembers from her childhood, pointing to her father’s pro 
bono offerings as one of her first inspirations to stand up for the poor, discriminated, and 
marginalized. “It would take me a long time to understand how systems inflict pain and 
hardship in people’s lives and to learn being kind in an unjust system is not enough.”124 
This realization, one that called her to a vocation of action, is one of the first she makes in 
Dead Man Walking: An Eyewitness Account of the Death Penalty in the United States, 
now a landmark work in the study of capital punishment and a major motion picture. In 
Dead Man Walking, Prejean chronicles her journey in accompanying two men, Elmo 
Patrick Sonnier and Robert Lee Willie, to the execution chamber after both were 
convicted of capital homicide. As each man’s spiritual advisor during his time on death 
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row, Prejean discovered pain, hardship, and other injustices present in the American legal 
system. She continued this process in advising three additional men during their time on 
death row, two of whom were Dobie Williams and Joseph O’Dell, whose stories she 
relates in The Death of Innocents, her second book. As the title suggests, Prejean strongly 
believed both Williams and O’Dell were innocent of the murders for which they were 
convicted and executed for crimes that they did not commit. Prejean now travels the 
globe, speaking, advocating, and acting in various capacities against the practice of the 
death penalty, particularly in the United States. For the adversity she observed in the 
situations of Patrick Sonnier and Robert Willie, the legal failure she believes occurred in 
the cases of Dobie Williams and Joe O’Dell, and various other reasons, Prejean calls for 
an end to capital punishment, acting daily on her Catholic conviction to preserve life, 
regardless of circumstance. 
 When I asked Prejean for a consolidated, comprehensive explanation of the basic 
reasons for her disagreement with the practice of the death penalty, she pointed me back 
to the 2005 statement from the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops regarding 
capital punishment, a document I referenced in Chapter 3. The statement, entitled “A 
Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death,” lists the following four reasons for which the 
United States should no longer exercise the death penalty: 
• The sanction of death, when it is not necessary to protect society, violates 
respect for human life and dignity. 
• State-sanctioned killing in our names diminishes all of us. 
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• Its application is deeply flawed and can be irreversibly wrong, is prone to 
errors, and is biased by factors such as race, the quality of legal 
representation, and where the crime was committed. 
• We have other ways to punish criminals and protect society.125  
The Bishops’ statement, which centers on these four points, calls ultimately for “common 
action to end the use of the death penalty, to reject a culture of death, and to build a 
culture of life.”126 It encompasses the loss of life Prejean has witnessed in execution 
chambers, the mistakes and wrongful executions she has discovered in her time with 
death row inmates, the hard-heartedness and indecency of government officials, 
corrections officials, and other operators of the machinery of death with whom she has 
interacted, and a line of thought that directly mirrors Pope John Paul II’s statements in 
Evangelium Vitae and the most recent version of the Catholic Catechism. “The Church 
doesn’t need another statement besides [the USCCB’s],” Prejean told me when I asked if 
the Catholic Church needs to issue a more binding or inclusive doctrine on the subject of 
capital punishment. “We need action,” she continued, “and we need education.”127 Given 
her experiences, Prejean has seen what Catholics and the rest of the American population 
need to know about capital punishment. She has lived in solidarity with the evils she 
identifies as present in the American practice of capital punishment, and now writes and 
speaks of these evils in the hope that action will be taken to do away with them.  
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 In accompanying five men to death row, Prejean has interacted with the multitude 
of individuals who stand in and along the road to an execution chamber. This multitude 
includes death row inmates themselves, Supreme Court Justices and other jurists, state 
governors, district attorneys, public defenders, and other attorneys, family and friends of 
victims of capital murders, family and friends of capital murderers, wardens, 
executioners, and all those who work in corrections and the penal system, social workers, 
politicians, lobbyists, priests and other clergy, the media, and other interested persons. 
This multitude, many of whom, in Prejean’s experience, were of a Christian disposition, 
if not Catholic, faces the same challenge Antonin Scalia, John Suthers, Prejean, and all 
those involved in legal matters engage: the integration of personal faith and morality with 
the duties and action vocation. For some, this integration permits the death penalty, or 
even demands it. For others, this integration results in a position in opposition to capital 
punishment, or an irreconcilable conflict of conscience that ends in the abandonment of a 
career. And still others, like Prejean, find inspiration in this integration to act against the 
death penalty, taking on a new role and vocation to advocate for change and reform. The 
individuals that line the road to a death chamber, though their positions on capital 
punishment may differ, together illustrate the breadth of choices that Catholics and other 
Christians make when confronted with the difficult moral questions of the death penalty. 
As Prejean demonstrates, these choices, when coupled with the actions that result from 
them, often carry the weight of life and death. 
 Elmo Patrick Sonnier was the first man Prejean accompanied to an execution 
chamber. Adapted in part as Michael Poncelet (Sean Penn) in Dead Man Walking’s film, 
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Sonnier’s story and death sparked Prejean’s career and present work as a death penalty 
abolitionist. In the early hours of the morning on November 5, 1977, Sonnier and his 
brother, Eddie, abducted Loretta Bourque and David LeBlanc, two teenagers from New 
Iberia, Louisiana. In a remote Iberia oilfield, the brothers handcuffed LeBlanc to a tree, 
Sonnier raped Bourque, and Bourque then agreed to consensual intercourse with Eddie 
when the brothers promised to release the couple safely if she agreed. Fearing the couple 
would report the brothers’ actions to authorities upon release, and that this report would 
result in Sonnier’s return to the Louisiana State Penitentiary, where he had previously 
served time, the brothers decided to kill the couple. The next morning, Louisiana 
authorities found the couple face-down in the Iberia oilfield, each dead after being shot 
three times in the back of the head at close range with a .22-caliber rifle. Initially, after 
mutually accusing each other at trial, Louisiana juries convicted both brothers of first-
degree murder and sentenced them to death, but upon review, a Louisiana appellate court 
reversed both convictions and sentencings. Eddie’s retrial resulted in a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole, and at Sonnier’s retrial, Eddie, now without the fear of 
death, recanted his initial accusation that Sonnier shot the couple and took responsibility 
for the killings himself. Sonnier later confirmed this version of the incident in private 
conference with Prejean during his time on death row. It appears that Eddie changed his 
account of the incident numerous times in an effort to avoid a death sentence, and 
Louisiana prosecutors successfully impeached his testimony at Sonnier’s second trial. 
Though Eddie avoided death at retrial, Sonnier was not so fortunate, and received another 
conviction for first-degree murder and the death sentence that accompanied it. Despite 
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various appeals and petitions, Sonnier’s conviction stood. The state of Louisiana 
executed him by electrocution on April 5, 1984.  
 Advising Sonnier during his time on death row not only revealed to Prejean a case 
in which the government executed an individual for a crime he may not have committed, 
but Prejean’s relationship with Sonnier also opened her eyes to other failures of the 
American legal system and the brutal inhumanity of capital executions. Put simply, 
Sonnier hardly met the expectations Prejean had before meeting him, and for that matter, 
whatever expectations the average American likely entertains for a capital murderer. 
When Prejean first arrived at the penitentiary to meet with Sonnier, a convicted rapist and 
murderer, he presented her with a picture frame he created in his cell with empty cigarette 
packages, a gift from a man she quickly found to be quite the opposite of the evil and 
malevolent villain that the media and reports of his crime had construed him to be. In 
talking with Sonnier, Prejean quickly discovered the badly blurred truth of fact in 
Sonnier’s trials, and the poor and inadequate state-appointed legal counsel who had 
represented him throughout the proceedings. Had Sonnier received the time and attention 
initially of a competent defense attorney (as in Millard Farmer, the attorney who would 
try to save his life in his final days), the wide discrepancies in accounts of his crime may 
have been exposed, and he may have avoided the electric chair. To Prejean, Sonnier was 
a troubled, underprivileged man who felt extreme sorrow for the wrongful actions of his 
life and deeply regretted all that had brought him to death row. When asked by the 
executioner if he had any last words, Sonnier turned to Lloyd LeBlanc, David’s father, a 
man intent on seeing Sonnier executed, and said, “Mr. LeBlanc, I don’t want to leave this 
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world with any hatred in my heart. I want to ask your forgiveness for what me and Eddie 
done, but Eddie done it.”128 Sonnier understood what he had done, and was sorry for his 
action. He was also fully aware of various injustices and irreconcilable aspects of the 
entire ordeal, an awareness that likely contributed to his decision not to apologize to 
Godfrey Bourque, Loretta’s father, also intent on Sonnier’s execution, who sat with 
Lloyd LeBlanc during the execution. Sonnier’s last words highlight the immense 
difficulty of forgiveness that capital cases present, another of Prejean’s discoveries in the 
process. Prejean listened to Sonnier’s last words, held his hand seconds before his death, 
and watched him die. Shortly after departing from the penitentiary after the execution, 
Prejean’s car pulled over to side of the road, she leaned out a door, and vomited, a 
physical manifestation of the moral nausea that Patrick Sonnier’s death brought her. 
 Although Patrick Sonnier died on April 5, 1984, he came alive again in various 
capacities in Prejean’s interaction with the other men she has accompanied to the death 
chamber. Six months after Sonnier’s execution, Prejean began writing to Robert Lee 
Willie, whom Louisiana executed on December 28, 1984, for the kidnapping, raping, and 
murdering of eighteen-year-old Faith Hathaway. In serving as Willie’s spiritual advisor, 
she found another indigent man convicted of and sentenced for a terrible crime without 
proper legal counsel, developed a relationship with a disturbed, but penitent, inmate, and 
watched him die. From July 24, 1996, to July 23, 1997, Prejean repeated the same cycle 
with Joseph O’Dell, the convicted murderer, rapist, and sodomist of forty-four-year-old 
Helen Schartner. Overzealous Virginia prosecutors, a jailhouse informant, and again, 
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inadequate defense counsel, doomed O’Dell. With the help of Prejean and Lori Urs, a 
prison ministry volunteer who believed in O’Dell’s innocence and married him in prison 
only days before his death, O’Dell disputed his conviction to the very end. His story and 
its controversy contributed to the 1997 changes in the Catholic catechism as discussed in 
Chapter 2. On January 8, 1999, Prejean witnessed Dobie Williams’s execution. Mentally 
disadvantaged, incredibly poor, and facing racial discrimination as an African-American, 
Williams also met an unforgiving justice system when convicted of stabbing and killing 
Sonja Knippers, a forty-three-year-old woman from Louisiana, another case in which 
questions remain as to the convicted’s guilt. Like O’Dell, Williams denied his conviction 
as a murderer until his execution, but to no avail. “I just want to say I got no hard feelings 
for anybody. God bless everybody,” Williams said in the spirit of forgiveness as he 
stepped into the execution chamber’s gurney to receive his lethal injection.129 Given all 
that Prejean experienced with Williams and the other men she has accompanied to death 
row, the message at the core of her work emerges in the underlying theme of Williams’ 
last words: mercy, and the option for reconciliation. But where Prejean found mercy in 
the hearts of death row inmates, she struggled to find it in many of the other individuals 
she encountered on the road to execution chambers. These individuals often separated 
themselves from the reality of capital punishment, complying with their expected duties 
and responsibilities while suppressing their personal beliefs and faith, whether merciful 
or otherwise. 
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 When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to overturn Patrick Sonnier’s 
second death sentence, Prejean met with then-Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards in the 
hope that Edwards would either commute Sonnier’s sentence or sway the state Pardon 
Board toward clemency. As governor, Edwards had the ability to commute sentences as 
he deemed necessary and prevent criminals from facing the death penalty, a privilege 
many governors still hold today. On March 27, 1984, a week before Sonnier’s execution, 
Edwards publicly refused to commute Sonnier’s sentence at a televised meeting with 
Prejean and others who sought mercy for Sonnier. “‘I’m the governor and represent the 
state and must carry out the laws and must submerge my own personal views to carry out 
the expressed will of the people,’” Edwards explained at the meeting, cleaning his hands 
of Sonnier’s end.130 Edwards was Louisiana’s first Catholic governor in the twentieth 
century, and presided over fifteen state executions during his four terms in office. 
“Edwards trie[d] to put the death process as far from himself as possible,” Prejean recalls 
from conversations with Edwards, in regard both to Sonnier’s case and other executions. 
“Still, he [couldn’t] escape the red telephone in the corner of the death chamber, where a 
call from him, even at the last minute, [would mean] life for the man being strapped in 
the chair and silence means death.”131 Edwards chose, fifteen times over, to remain silent, 
subordinating his personal belief regarding capital punishment, whatever it might have 
been, to the will of the Louisiana people and the death penalty they supported during his 
time in office. He often encouraged those who opposed the death penalty to raise 
legislation to abolish it, a suggestion he made to Prejean and those present at the meeting 
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on March 27. In 16 years as Louisiana’s governor, Edwards never made an affirmative 
action to execute a criminal. He did, however, make fifteen choices, and fifteen times, he 
chose to allow the machinery of death to operate as it would. 
 Sixteen years following Prejean and Edwards’s meeting, then-Illinois Governor 
George Ryan, a Methodist, declared a state-wide moratorium on the death penalty in 
January 2000. Three years later, on January 11, 2003, Ryan commuted the death 
sentences of the 167 convicts on Illinois’s death row at the time, changing their 
sentencing agreements to life imprisonment as appropriate. “I don’t know if we’ll ever go 
back to the death penalty as we knew it, as long as I’m governor,” Ryan stated, opting for 
what he saw as the only guaranteed solution to prevent the conviction and execution of a 
rapidly growing number of innocent individuals convicted of capital crimes in the 
state.132 “He blamed rogue cops, zealous prosecutors, incompetent defense lawyers, and 
judges who rule on technicalities rather on what is right” as the basis for the moratorium, 
Prejean explains in Death of Innocents.133 Ryan picked up the red telephone at the end of 
execution chambers throughout the state and, unlike Edwards, chose not to remain silent. 
He saw a flawed and broken system of capital justice in Illinois, and moved to fix it given 
the power of his office as governor. As a Republican and consistent political supporter of 
the death penalty, Ryan drew significant criticism for his decision. Many questioned the 
motive behind his decision, and some suspected he declared the moratorium to resurrect 
his public image given ongoing corruption investigations and other scandals during his 
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time in office. Others criticized him for abusing the power vested in him as governor. 
Regardless of motive, Ryan acted as he did because he saw a problem with the death 
penalty and commutation as the solution to it, and by acting, revived the longstanding 
national debate on the morality of capital punishment. His action was one of personal 
conviction and belief, a difficult choice that elicited the expected response of controversy 
and saved the lives of 167 Illinois convicts. 
 In considering Ryan’s mass commutation, Prejean predictably praises his action, 
while detailing her disagreement and disappointment with Governor Edwards. “Politics 
plays its part,” Prejean concludes in her analysis of Edwards’s decision. “Dare [a 
governor] risk his political career to save the lives of a few condemned criminals? What’s 
a governor to do?” she asks.134 “Every human being must take a stand when discerning 
the morality of capital punishment,” she told me in our interview. “Some will choose 
based on politics, others on justice. But everyone must separate what they need to do 
from what they want to do.”135 Edwards and Ryan both took a stand as governor. 
Edwards placed his personal feelings on the death penalty aside, or refused to admit 
them, in order to rule as expected. His choice was one of politics and, though it 
complicates Prejean’s posed dichotomy, one he felt was just. His Catholic faith, however, 
was an afterthought. The difficulty he experienced in separating the needs and wants of 
his choice and the turmoil of conscience therein are quite evident given Prejean’s 
interaction with him as he deliberated over Sonnier’s fate. Conversely, Ryan’s choice, 
though quite the opposite and rooted in impassioned personal conviction, was also one of 
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politics, and one he felt was just. Of the 167 individuals pardoned, some were indeed 
innocent of the capital crimes for which they were sentenced, and others still guilty. For 
this reason and others, many criticized him for an exercise of power that stepped outside 
of the voting will of the people of Illinois, its courts, and its juries. Prejean applauds 
Ryan’s action as governor, but despite the lives saved, questions remain as to the personal 
motivation behind his action and the means of arriving at it. So, what, then, is the best 
course of executive action for a governor given the situations Edwards and Ryan faced, 
particularly a governor of a Catholic or Christian disposition? Is it possible to separate 
needs and wants in decision making given the will of the people and the power of a 
gubernatorial office? As governors, Edwards and Ryan attempted to walk lines that 
separate just pardoning and judicial policymaking, personal faith and the will of the 
people, and quite literally, life and death. Their choices mark the path of their walk, a 
path that, given the Christian understanding of their faith traditions, assumes the powers 
of mercy and condemnation that ultimately belong to God, powers that perhaps exceed 
the scope of a gubernatorial office.  
Shortly before Patrick Sonnier’s execution, Prejean spoke with Paul C. Phelps, the 
head of the Louisiana Department of Corrections at the time and supervisor of 
executions, a “‘good, Catholic man’” with the ability to exercise powers of mercy and 
condemnation, to discuss Sonnier’s fate and her objections to the execution process.136 
Phelps listened intently, explained that all would go on as planned, and arranged for 
Prejean to attend Sonnier’s execution. He promised her he would “‘make sure that [the] 
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event [was] carried out with as much dignity and respect as possible,’” and when the day 
of Sonnier’s execution came, he calmly and willingly fulfilled his promise.137 After the 
execution, Prejean met again with Phelps, remembering that his “cool, professional tone 
had terrified [her],” a man far too comfortable with the duties of one who supervises 
executions.138 When she asked Phelps what he believed executions accomplished, he 
replied, “‘Nothing,’” detailing his view that the death penalty is not an effective deterrent 
and concluding that “By its nature the criminal justice system will always be somewhat 
arbitrary.’”139 Prejean challenged these responses, asking how Phelps reconciled his 
duties as a supervisor of executions with personally held beliefs that seemingly opposed 
the expectations of his job. “Do you experience any conflict of conscience between your 
personal religious beliefs and what your job calls you to do?” she questioned.140 Phelps 
responded, in language reminiscent of Governor Edwards, that the law was not his, and 
he had no choice but to follow it, maintaining that he had no “personal responsibility” in 
the process.141 He then clarified, like Antonin Scalia and John Suthers, that if he morally 
opposed any part of his job, he would resign, and would have refused to take the job 
initially. When Prejean asked if he would ever consider attending one of the executions 
he supervised, he said, quite plainly, that he never would – an odd choice, she thought, 
for a supervisor to so adamantly separate himself from that which he supervises. Their 
interaction ended in this type of oddity and paradox. “‘From a personal standpoint it is 
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very, very bizarre to design a process like this,’” Phelps explained to Prejean.142 But, 
despite all reservations, Phelps designed and supervised executions, separating personal 
belief and public duty in a way Prejean never understood and forever rejected.  
 In Death of Innocents, Prejean praises the work of Donald Cabana, a man quite 
similar to Phelps in title and career, but quite dissimilar in the practice of his vocation. 
Cabana, a devout Catholic, spent twenty-five years in prison work, during which he gave 
orders to execute two men during his time as the prison warden at the Mississippi State 
Penitentiary in Parchman, MS. One of the men, Connie Ray Evans, catalyzed in Cabana a 
powerful execution room epiphany reminiscent of Prejean’s encounter with Patrick 
Sonnier and her other spiritual mentees. Cabana gives an account of Connie’s final 
minutes in Death at Midnight: The Confession of an Executioner, detailing both his work 
as an executioner and the experiences that brought him to oppose the societal practice of 
capital punishment. After the prison chaplain led the execution chamber in the Lord’s 
Prayer in the moments leading up to Connie’s execution, Connie turned to Cabana and 
left the following indelible mark on his conscience: 
As we shook hands, Connie thanked me for the many kindnesses extended 
to him by the staff. Then, with a sheepish laugh, he asked if the warden 
would be embarrassed if an inmate hugged him. Searching fruitlessly for 
comforting words, we silently embraced for a long moment.143  
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After their embrace, Cabana felt compelled to comfort the man whose life he was 
prepared to end. “Connie spoke quietly […] He wanted to whisper his final words to me,” 
Cabana recalls. “He thanked me for being his friend. I started to speak, but he asked me 
to wait, and then told me softly, ‘From one Christian to another, I love you.’ I wanted to 
respond, but no words would come. Now I was the one in shock, shaken to my very 
soul.”144 Connie found forgiveness and thanksgiving in his final moments of life. He 
transformed the retribution cited as cause for his execution, returning the hardship of his 
time on death row with love for his executioners. Cabana hardly knew what to do, or how 
to respond. Connie’s love for him redefined the intersection of his work as an executioner 
with the beliefs of his Catholic faith, and Cabana was never the same. 
 Connie’s execution, as indicated, shook Cabana’s very soul. It questioned the 
justice he once found in the death penalty, and challenged him to reconsider the 
punishment of death he had previously held as a societally necessary measure of 
retribution. “If Connie Ray Evans was some awful monster deemed worthy of 
extermination, why did I feel so bad about it?” he remembers thinking. “As I watched a 
grieving mother leave her son for the last time,” reflecting on Connie’s final goodbye to 
his mother, “I questioned how the sordid business of executions was supposed to be the 
great equalizer.”145 Cabana stepped outside of what Phelps defined as the “proper role of 
an executioner,” allowing his personal feelings and emotions from the experience to 
compromise the expectations of his office. It took years for him to settle the turmoil 
Connie raised in his conscience. Cabana never stepped down from his position as warden, 
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as Phelps promised Prejean he would have had he experienced the transformation Cabana 
did. Instead, he continued along in his work. “Each new day’s crises kept me from having 
to think or remember. But nothing could dispel the feelings I harbored inside. Try as I 
did, I could not remove the lingering doubt or bewilderment,” Cabana confesses.146 When 
he wrote about his experience with Connie and as a warden years later, it was only then 
that he could muster the courage to reveal his true sentiment: that he had done wrong as 
an executioner, he felt tremendous guilt for his action, and he had no option in moving 
forward but to call for the abolishment of capital punishment and save not only the lives 
of sentenced murderers, but the lives of executioners committed to carrying out the 
supposed justice of the state without any consideration for their own convictions. He 
concludes his book with the following prescription: 
This is not a particularly good time in which to find myself an opponent of 
capital punishment. Paradoxically, however, […] it may also be the best of 
times. Never has there been a greater need for rationality and clear 
thinking. Absent the emotionalism and histrionics that have always been 
so characteristic of the debate, the present offers greater opportunity then 
ever for pragmatism and calm deliberation. There is much need, and room, 
for both.147  
Given Cabana’s career choice, he never found a particularly good time to oppose capital 
punishment, but as he suggests, he found plenty of opportunities. His call for an 
intentional, thorough, and critical review of the practice of capital punishment in 
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contemporary society is as necessary today as when he authored his book, particularly for 
executioners and those directly involved in carrying out the death penalty. And finally, 
there is much need, and much room, for not only pragmatism and calm deliberation, but 
for action as well, as Prejean’s work suggests. It is time for those involved in capital 
matters to take into account what they personally believe and act upon it in responsible 
and appropriate ways, like Cabana, rather than hide behind a cloak of duty without 
thought and acquiesce to the present system of punishment in passivity.  
 Prejean, obviously, is one who has accepted this challenge, but not without 
difficulty. Although she reflects on her experiences with Patrick Sonnier and other death 
row inmates with the impassioned conviction and humble confidence of an activist, the 
true struggle of her work emerges in her interaction with the families of those murdered, 
and the only regret of her experiences, particularly in Sonnier’s case, remains her initial 
failure to care for these families as she should have. Prejean did not interact with either 
family until an irreparable impression of negligence had been made. After Sonnier’s 
Pardon Board hearing, David LeBlanc’s father, Lloyd, introduced himself to Prejean for 
the first time and said, “‘Sister, I’m a Catholic. How can you present Elmo Patrick 
Sonnier’s side like this without ever having come to visit with me and my wife or the 
Bourques to hear our side?”148 LeBlanc’s question brought Prejean down to the pain and 
suffering of the situation in which she was engaged. She took the confrontation to heart, 
and never again neglected the presence and concerns of victims’ families. “I see now that 
I devoted my energies exclusively to Pat Sonnier’s plight when I should have shouldered 
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the struggles of the victims’ families,” she acknowledges in Dead Man Walking. “I 
should have reached out to the Bourques and LeBlancs immediately and offered them 
love and comfort, even if they chose to reject it.”149 Prejean’s regret led to action on 
behalf of victims and their families. In 1988, Prejean teamed with Janet Yassen, a 
coordinator of the Victims Violence Program in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Dianne 
Kidner, a New Orleans Mennonite Volunteer, to create Survive, a New Orleans-based 
victim assistance group still in existence today.150 “All the sorrow and loss is 
overwhelming, yet I don’t feel devastated,” Prejean reported in 1991 after attending a 
women’s meeting of Survive and hearing mothers’ stories of murdered loved ones. 
“There’s something in the women that strengthens me […] they have grace, tenacity, a 
great capacity to absorb pain and loss and yet endure.”151 After overcoming her initial 
lapse in attending to victims’ families, this became Prejean’s general sentiment: the 
stories of murder victims are inevitably horrific tragedies, but hope and resolve outlast 
hatred and vengeance in the hearts of those that survive their loved ones. Several years 
after Patrick Sonnier’s execution, Lloyd LeBlanc corroborated this conclusion. Though 
he continues to struggle with expected animosity toward Sonnier, LeBlanc eventually 
recanted his wish for Sonnier’s execution and told Prejean he would have accepted life 
imprisonment in lieu of the death penalty. LeBlanc’s example is the greatest testament to 
forgiveness Prejean has encountered in decades of work with death row inmates and the 
families of murder victims. Though she missed him at the start of her journey, LeBlanc 
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confirmed for Prejean that tragedies of murder and death can find reconciliation in those 
that remain.  
 This reconciliation, however, is never easy, and no one made this distinction 
clearer to Prejean than Vernon Harvey, who Prejean met during her counsel of Robert 
Lee Willie. Harvey, the stepfather of Faith Hathaway, Willie’s victim, anxiously 
anticipated Willie’s execution, telling the press he couldn’t wait to see “‘smoke fly off 
[Willie’s] body’” and find consolation for the loss of his stepdaughter in watching Willie 
die.152 Harvey’s first words to Prejean upon their introduction in Baton Rouge, “‘Watch 
out or someone is going to hurt you,’” set the tone for what would be a contentious 
relationship that lasted long past Willie’s eventual execution.153 Although Prejean and 
Harvey entertained several friendly exchanges at the Harvey’s home and elsewhere both 
throughout and following Willie’s death, their viewpoints never converged, as in the case 
of Lloyd LeBlanc. An elated Harvey told reporters immediately following Willie’s 
execution that Willie died too quickly and should have underwent the same torment and 
anguish his stepdaughter did, and that he was so happy Willie died that he could dance.154 
In frustration and relative helplessness, Prejean resolved to avoid Harvey and his wife, 
Elizabeth, following Willie’s execution, but quickly found she could not avoid them. She 
ran into the Harveys again and again – at death penalty rallies, executions, conferences, 
seminars, a Parents of Murdered Children group session, even in the New Orleans 
Veterans’ hospital following Harvey’s open-heart surgery. At these meetings, Harvey 
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typically rattled off his favorite pro-death penalty arguments, many grounded in 
retribution, and Prejean responded with her favorite counterarguments, often calling for 
Harvey to reconsider the violent effect of state executions on society. Harvey never truly 
found the satisfaction in Willie’s death he sought, frequently lamenting the speed and 
painlessness of his execution. Their difference of opinion produced a strange friendship 
and lively, albeit contentious, conversation. Harvey complicated Prejean’s belief in 
reconciliation for all involved in capital matters. He demonstrated that while forgiveness 
is always possible, it must be chosen, fought for, and worked toward. The families of 
murder victims should be angry, and sometimes, they remain so, even when vengeance is 
not enough.  
On August 19, 1993, Antoinette “Toni” Bosco, a New York-based Catholic, 
writer, columnist, and mother of six, received word that John, one of her sons, and his 
wife, Nancy, had been murdered in their Montana home. As the investigation of their 
deaths progressed and the police identified their murderer, Bosco underwent the expected 
hardship of a mother of victims of a brutal homicide. “I had felt the anger that makes one 
crazy enough to kill,” she retells in Choosing Mercy, her account of the incident and 
aftermath, “and at times I believed that if ever the murderer was caught, I would not 
know if I could want his life spared.”155 But when she first viewed the room in the 
Montana home where her son and daughter-in-law had died, viewed the stain of blood on 
the walls and floor, and touched the scattered bulletholes with her own hands, a powerful 
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transformation occurred within her that reviled all forms of the “evil of unnatural 
death.”156 She explains: 
I knew that I could never accept unnatural death at the hands of another 
again, not even when it is called legitimate, but more so, I knew why. Life 
and death are God’s territory, not ours. I wanted the killer found, put 
away, and punished. I knew I would have to struggle a long time with my 
feelings, because the anger was still so fresh. But never would I be able to 
say, ‘Kill the killer.’157 
Bosco’s experience led not only to her rejection of unnatural death by way of murder, but 
to her denial of the legitimacy of unnatural death as state-authored defense. She could not 
accept the human regulation of life and death, shying away from the moral ground of 
ultimate judgment. She refused to support murder as retributive punishment, answering 
the anger and violence of her son’s death with forgiveness and a renewed pursuit of life, 
and has since taken her cause on the road with Prejean and many others, calling for the 
abolition of capital punishment in the United States. 
 Bosco’s translation of personal belief to action is a bold commitment not without 
challenge and doubt. “I had to ask myself back then, and over and over since then,” she 
acknowledges in Choosing Mercy, “do I have enough of God’s love in me to pray for this 
young killer? Perhaps. Because I do pray for him, knowing in my soul that I must, for the 
sake of my own redemption.”158 Bosco insists that she pray for the man who murdered 
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her son, an exercise of humility that can only come through true forgiveness. Not only 
does she strive to pray for him, but she equates herself with him, an innocent victim’s 
mother paralleled with a heinous killer. She realizes that she is one with the murderer in 
the solidarity of sin and the greater need for redemption. In solidarity with murderers, 
therefore, Bosco passionately pleads for their lives. “Very often they (people in support 
of capital punishment) point to people like me,” she notes. “They say the only way I can 
have ‘justice’ is to see the murderer killed. But I ask, what good can come of heaping 
more violence upon the violence already done? I beg, please don’t ask to kill in my 
name.”159 Based on her own experience of having her son violently and unexpectedly 
taken, Bosco pleads that violence not beget more violence, and shows that specious 
definitions of justice often rely on the merit of violent punishment and vengeance. Her 
experience demands that she, like Prejean, take her understanding of justice without 
violence to a higher level of action and advocacy, a step beyond her identity as a murder 
victim’s mother to solidarity with the murdered and their murderers. 
The stories of those Prejean has met in courtrooms, on death row, in execution 
chambers, and elsewhere within the American capital legal process – the stories of 
Patrick Sonnier, Edwin Edwards, Lloyd LeBlanc, Vernon Harvey, and even Justice 
Antonin Scalia – tell Prejean’s story. Given the enormity of her work, the characters and 
people involved in her experience demonstrate concretely what she means when she 
states that she “lives on the ground.” These stories and their characters, therefore, bring 
out one of the central messages in her work, a message as or more important than her 
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general call to end the death penalty in America: get involved, meet the people the law 
serves and regulates, and ultimately, join her on the ground.  
At the conclusion of her discussion of Scalia in Death of Innocents, Prejean tells the story 
of one, final individual. His name is David Bates, and during a question-and-answer 
portion of remarks Antonin Scalia gave at the University of Chicago regarding the death 
penalty, he stood up and told about his experience with the American legal system. “‘I’m 
a formerly incarcerated individual, served ten years in prison, was falsely accused of a 
crime, tortured, beaten,’” he explained. “‘You have innocent people on death row right 
now, who have been forced to sign confessions, who have been tortured, suffocated, 
beaten […] I’m scared. I’m worried.’”160 Reflecting on Bates’ bravery, Prejean writes: 
At that polite, intellectual conference he stood up, the only speaker that 
day who knew personally that the broken, flawed criminal justice system 
does to people. Bates spoke with an authority that cut through the jocular 
atmosphere, confronting everyone with hard realities, because he’s been 
there, he’s lived on the ground.161 
Prejean’s work paints a rather gruesome picture of the criminal justice system, a portrayal 
that emphasizes many elements that need reform, and very few aspects of the system 
which function well, despite many aspects that do. Though Bates was the only speaker 
that day who stood up and told his story, an unfortunate, awful story, the law serves the 
public that were present at that conference and elsewhere, in a general sense, better than 
Prejean admits. Her work can leave readers wondering if our nation’s legal system does 
                                                             
160 Prejean, Death of Innocents, 223. 
161 Ibid.  
100 
 
anything right or just, or if it is simply a biased, discriminatory, and thoughtless system of 
violence and vengeance. This is not Prejean’s intent, and fortunately so, because our legal 
system does do justice, and it does seek what is right. Her lasting point, however, that our 
nation needs individuals like Bates to stand, speak, and act to reform the legal system 
where reformation is needed, could not be more true given the various testimonies of her 
work. The American practice of capital punishment is one area in need of reformation 
and reconsideration, whether or not Prejean’s call to abolish the death penalty completely 
should be enacted. As societal standards of defense and justice evolve in the United 
States, so also should the consciences of individuals in society, whether informed by 
Catholic faith, some other form of Christianity, or otherwise. Her work invokes a duty on 
all to seek out the best response to the most challenging evils of our time, with murder, 
whether by the state or an individual, being perhaps the most apparent evil, and pursue 
without end the best means of preserving and sustaining human life.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
 It is tempting, given the span of Catholic viewpoints on capital punishment in the 
United States that Antonin Scalia, John Suthers, and Helen Prejean provide, to wonder 
who has it right, and who does not. Are Scalia and Suthers justified in their consistent 
support for the death penalty, even in light of Church teaching that suggests otherwise? Is 
Prejean more correct in her view that the death penalty should be abolished entirely, and 
that all who murder, regardless of circumstance, should live nonetheless? Or is there 
some middle ground or position that combines differing viewpoints in a way that best 
follows Church teaching and applies the teaching in the most rational manner on behalf 
of society?  
 At some level, it seems that each viewpoint is correct. Scalia and Suthers are 
correct in that society must answer the wrong that murderers commit with a punishment 
of commensurate weight. Punishment is a necessary component in maintaining social 
order and enforcing a society’s social contract. But Prejean’s belief that punishment 
should function to change the life of a murderer in a positive way, rather than 
automatically end it, also has merit. She personally and intimately understands the 
renewal to which murderers can aspire, and commendably fights for their lives. At the 
same time, however, Scalia, Suthers, and Prejean all seem wrong in certain aspects. 
Scalia and Suthers are misguided in their overall understanding of Church teaching on the 
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death penalty. They are too unyielding in their conviction that heinous murderers deserve 
the death penalty, and unwisely obstinate in their support of the state’s motivation to 
enact retribution. The most tragic cases of heinous murder, however, repeatedly test 
Prejean’s position that no murderer should die as punishment for killing, regardless of 
how premeditated, widespread, and/or blatantly evil the action of murder. She also 
promotes a general skepticism of the American system of criminal justice that threatens 
the potential for mutually agreeable future action to limit or remove the state’s option to 
exercise capital punishment.  
But if Scalia, Suthers, and Prejean are all right, and if Scalia, Suthers, and Prejean 
are all wrong, who wins in the end? What, ultimately, should be done? 
 When angry, troubled individuals end innocent lives, and a state of divinely-given 
authority entrusted with the governance of a broken society must provide an answer for 
killing, no one wins. The presence of Augustine’s City of Man162 in the United States is 
an unfortunate, yet plainly apparent, reality. Sinful humans will never stop killing. They 
will only find more efficient means of cruel and calculated murder, and tragically 
enough, more victims. The state, then, has no future option but to continue to respond to 
murder to the best extent possible, pushing onward in improving correctional systems and 
developing corresponding means of defending society and preventing the action of 
killing. This conflict will not cease. A change in mindset, therefore, must occur: a shift 
away from adversarial, right-wrong, win-lose thinking among those like Scalia, Suthers, 
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and Prejean to a new, cooperative agenda aimed at modeling the City of God with life as 
society’s highest attainable prize.  
Given the contemporary practice of capital punishment in the United States, the 
Cities of God and Man may not be very far apart. Scalia, Suthers, Prejean, and those like 
them already hold the prize of life in high esteem. But action can be taken to hold life in 
the highest esteem – wider circulation and understanding the Catholic Church’s teaching 
on the death penalty, increased societal commitment to restorative justice and the renewal 
of murderers, and reform, improvement, and further development of society’s ability to 
defend itself without recourse to the death penalty – and with this action, American 
society can continue in its search for the answer of greatest justice for the greatest evils it 
faces. It is, perhaps, inconclusive whether or not the United States needs the death 
penalty, and inconclusive whether or not the Catholic Church explicitly condones or 
condemns its use in every American context. But the tremendous value of human life, 
and the enormous importance of the task of promoting human life, is anything but 
inconclusive. 
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AFTERWORD 
 
When I started this project, I thought that just by reading, thinking, and writing, I 
might answer Helen Prejean’s call and make a contribution to our nation’s discussion of 
the death penalty and our discernment of its practice. The time for me to act and live in 
this realm, I thought, remains in the future. The true opportunity to inform my conscience 
through action will come, I decided, but for now, I am doing all I can. Some day, I will 
defend capital offenders, or prosecute them on behalf of society, or assume divinely-
given authority and issue judgments that promote life, or witness an execution, but not 
today. For the time being, my written work is enough. 
 But when I started to read and study Helen Prejean’s work and truly grasp the 
intent of her message, I realized I could not just write and wait, even though I hope this 
work achieves the force of effect with which it is given, and makes some impact in itself. 
Presently, I cannot practice law or participate through the other roles I have listed here. 
But as I came to the end of this project of research and discovery, I knew I had to do 
something; not everything, not answer the greatest and hardest questions about the death 
penalty, not save the world, but something. In January, at a radio interview in which I 
discussed my work with Michael J. Sheridan, Bishop of Colorado Springs, he encouraged 
me to pray for those on death row and our society as a whole as we wrestle with the 
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difficult issues at play in our practice capital punishment. I prayed as he suggested, but 
wanted to do more.  
  So, in January, I wrote to Matt Puckett for the first time. Matt is a death row 
inmate at Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, MS, the penitentiary at which 
Donald Cabana was warden when two executions shook his soul irreparably. I found 
Matt’s contact information online at a website that advertises death row inmates looking 
for pen pals. (Many such websites are available, though Matt’s profile has since been 
removed.) Given the multitude of inmates seeking correspondence by writing, I chose 
Matt, oddly enough, because he reminded me of myself. His profile picture featured a 
young man in a baseball hat at a restaurant or some other public locale, blond hair, blue 
eyes, and Catholic. The profile expressed an interest in sports, featured an extensive 
reading list, and briefly discussed his background in the military. “My life held great 
potential for adventure and excitement,” he wrote in his profile. “I came from a loving 
family and had many friends. Then things went horribly wrong.” 
 In February, Matt wrote back for the first time. His letter did not include details 
regarding what and how things went horribly wrong. Frankly, I am not too concerned 
with what Matt did. In time, he will tell me if he wishes, and I could probably find the 
information on the Internet, but I do not plan to search. From what I have read, Matt was 
born on January 3, 1977. He was sentenced to death on August 5, 1996, and began 
serving his sentence on August 10, 1996. Another date looms on which his death 
sentence will come to bear, unless circumstances provide otherwise, but for now, like me, 
he spends his days reading, thinking, and writing.   
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 Then again, who am I kidding? Of course I am curious about what Matt did to end 
up on death row, and I would be lying if I suggested otherwise. It has been hard to avoid 
publicly available information about his crime. I have done my best to steer around it, but 
where I have failed, I have only glimpsed the details of an awful murder. His story, 
though I do not know it completely, is strikingly tragic in the way Pope John Paul II 
discusses such incidents in Evangelium Vitae. I do not know all of the details, and I 
intend to continue to navigate around them as possible, unless Matt writes me otherwise. 
Regardless, I am frequently reminded that I write letters to a murderer, and the process 
continually calls me to separate the human, baseball hat-wearing reader from the worst 
action of his life, and, as Augustine first said, separate sin from sinner.  
 In his letter, Matt wrote about boredom, the greatest hardship he faces in prison. 
He wrote about his goals and New Year’s resolutions, one of which is to write at least 
one letter every day. Over the last three years, he’s written 1267 letters, one way to 
combat the boredom of life imprisonment. He also tries to learn a new vocabulary word 
every week, and is in the process of reading toward a “college-level science 
education.”163 Matt also writes short stories and essays, and some of his work is available 
online. Though Matt’s education ended with a high school diploma, his written work is 
impressively creative and articulate. In “Too Close for Comfort,” an essay posted on 
Prisoner Express: The bridge between prisoners and the outside world, Matt discusses 
the process of “taking turns” in life. He begins the essay with one such turn: 
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It’s your turn. Picture yourself on deck in a baseball game. The bat is in 
your hands and you feel the weight and texture of it as you do warm-up 
swings […] You step up to the plate with a tingling excitement coursing 
through you. You stare down the pitcher, daring him to pitch anything 
remotely to your liking […] The pitch comes and in a second your mind 
calculates the speed and direction as your eyes never leave the ball […] 
Your body torques, swinging the bat; it connects with the ball with a 
resounding crack. The ball has left you quicker than it came to you and 
sails out of the park. As you make the circuit of bases the excitement in 
you can barely be contained. A huge smile crosses your face that you 
aren't even aware of. The thrill is wonderful.164 
The thrill is so wonderful, Matt suggests, because the activity he describes – warming-up 
on deck, stepping-up to the plate, hitting the ball, rounding the bases, smiling – is entirely 
voluntarily, all a product of the wonderful thrill of choice. Activities are less wonderful in 
life, Matt explains, when they come involuntarily, in instances in which turns are not 
chosen or preferred. “It's just too close for comfort for me,” Matt concludes in the essay. 
“I know how close my turn is and it even makes my heart race to write about a sequence 
of events that I am, at present, safely removed from.”165 Six men have been executed 
during Matt’s time in prison, and he fears each day that his name might come next in the 
batting order. 
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 “I hope you don’t get offended,” Matt wrote in the beginning of his letter to me, 
“but this question needs to be asked […] What I want to know is should I expect this 
correspondence to be nothing more than a research jaunt, or will you look to write even 
afterwards?”166 When you are finished writing, are you finished with the project, Matt 
seemingly asked me, or has the process and research impacted you enough to commit to 
action? Am I just writing this thesis for scholarship’s (or graduation’s) sake, I thought 
immediately, or do I actually care about the people I have encountered along the way?  
“Everybody has questions, totally normal, but it doesn’t feel all that great if people write 
[to me] with only the intent to sieve information and not get to know the person – me,” 
Matt explained. “You need both to get the full effect.”167 I do not intend to stop writing to 
Matt anytime soon. He will get plenty of letters, as well as other reading material. I 
intend to send him a copy of the final draft of this project, and after that, a copy of Dead 
Man Walking to add to his reading list. In the years to come, I hope our relationship will 
continue to develop, and that I gain a wider understanding of both his person and the 
information he possesses through our letters.  
Though my conscience regarding the practice of capital punishment in American 
society remains labored and somewhat unresolved as this project ends, I am sure enough 
that I will never be able to separate myself from the questions and individuals involved in 
this effort, particularly Matt. In the future, when I continue to contemplate many of the 
questions and issues I have raised in this effort, I am confident that I will remember the 
words of Thomas Aquinas, Pope John Paul II, and John Suthers. More so, however, I am 
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certain that I will think of Matt, and pray that if his turn in the order does indeed come, he 
steps up to the plate with courage and belief in the eternal peace that awaits him. Until 
then, I will continue to picture him in an imagined prison yard at the Mississippi State 
Penitentiary, firmly gripping the handle of a baseball bat, gazing intently at an incoming 
pitch, swinging, connecting, rounding the bases, smiling, and living each day with hope 
not yet lost.   
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